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I. Introduction
Corruption is an economic crime that generates, at least in some of its forms enor-
mous amounts of illicit proceeds. In recent years, corruption assumed very advanced
positions on legal and political agendas both nationally and internationally, in both
developed and developing countries. However, concern for corruption in developing
countries and its impact on economic development remains paramount. This concern
has been translated into various attempts at dealing with the problem. The international
community became actively involved in tackling the problem and various instruments
were designed for that purpose. The World Bank incorporated corruption in its agenda
for assisting its target countries. The OECD countries passed and to a great extent imple-
mented a convention on transnational bribery. These, however, were in addition to many
other international agencies that contributed their own initiatives in dealing with this
problem.
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This paper is concerned with the use of money laundering control in the fight
against corruption. The core argument is that money laundering control allows the states
as members of the international community to extend the reach of their laws to corrupt
practices in other countries where the corrupt ruling regime necessarily inhibits any local
attempt at penalising its corruption.
II. Corruption: Definition and Overview
A. DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION
Corruption belongs to the category of concepts that are widely discussed, and
hardly defined. Various factors contribute to this elusiveness of the concept. Historically,
corruption was used synonymously with sin thus encompassing "the entire moral life of
mankind." This historical use gives the word a metaphorical quality that it maintains to
our current time and that partly accounts for its lack of precision.2 The verbal impreci-
sion of the metaphor is further accentuated by the lax use of the word in the media and
political life.
The concept is a cross-disciplinary one. It is analyzed by writers in economics,
political science, sociology, anthropology, public administration, business, and law. While
cross-disciplinary analysis of such phenomena is essential, it does not readily help develop
a precise commonly accepted definition of the concept discussed.3
Corruption is also normative in character. To judge a certain conduct as corrupt
necessarily implies reference to a set of values that are perceived to be breached by that
conduct. This immediately imposes the question of the source of these norms and its
legitimacy.' It also renders the definition of what is corrupt culturally relative, which
poses difficulties for both historical and comparative research.'
Earlier writing on corruption was preoccupied with the question of definition. By
contrast, current writing relies on working definitions6 and a common perception of
1. Jean-Claude Waquet, Introduction to POLITICALCORRUPTION IN EUROPE AND LATINAMERICA 1,
at 2 (Walter Little & Eduardo Posada-Carb6 eds., 1996).
2. See Robert C. Brooks, The Nature of Political Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READ-
INGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 56, at 56 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed., 1970) (discussing the
metaphorical nature of the term).
3. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Corruption-A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World
Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 453-58 (1997) (discussing different disciplinary approaches
to the definition of corruption).
4. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Introduction to POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 6-9 (analyzing this question and its possible answers).
5. Id. at 8-9; see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CON-
SEQUENCES, AND REFORM 91-110 (1999) (the author makes an interesting attempt to avoid
the cultural dilemma through economic analysis of the cost of what is culturally acceptable);
ROBERT E. KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 134-55 (1988) (offering an interesting
case study of cultural clash on the question of corruption).
6. See, e.g., KLITGAARD, supra note 5, at xi ("I will not spend much time on definition.
Corruption exists when an individual illicitly puts personal interests above those of the people
and ideals he or she is pledged to serve.").
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the problem that allows those involved to recognize a case of corruption when one is
exposed.7
One of the most commonly accepted definitions is the World Bank's definition of
corruption as "the abuse of public office for private gain."' In choosing this definition
the Bank's report emphasises the difficulty inherent in attempting to define a term that
"covers a broad range of human actions "'9 The report's approach to this problem is to
adopt a "straightforward definition""0 that is "concise and broad enough to include most
forms' And then to develop "a taxonomy of the different forms corruption could take
consistent with that definition."12
Despite the Bank's definition of corruption as a public sector phenomenon, it is
important to note that it acknowledges the existence of corruption in the private sector.
Its report on the problem of corruption states that "[f]raud and bribery can and do
take place in the private sector, often with costly results. Unregulated financial systems
permeated with fraud can undermine savings and deter foreign investment. They also
make a country vulnerable to financial crises and macroeconomic instability."3 It goes
on to indicate that despite this fact the Bank's concern is with public sector corruption.
14
The basis of this policy is the perception of public sector corruption as a "more serious
problem in developing countries."1"
It is the author's view that corruption should be perceived more generally as includ-
ing both private and public corruption and that public corruption is not necessarily more
serious. This paper, however, is concerned with corrupt governments whose corruption
in itself prevents any accountability to their citizens. For this reason, it will be confined
to public corruption and will accept the aforementioned definition of the World Bank
as a good departure point for the analysis to follow.
Corruption has been categorized into different types according to various criteria.
In this context I would like to draw attention to three of those categories.
1. Grand v. Petty Corruption
This distinction is based on the size of the wealth corruptly acquired and the senior-
ity of the corrupt official.' 6 Grand corruption describes situations where a senior official
abuses his office to achieve substantial pecuniary gain. It usually takes place in the context
7. See Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures 8, IMF
Staff Papers, vol. 45, no. 4 (1998) ("However, like an elephant, while it may be difficult to
describe, corruption is generally not difficult to recognize when observed.").
8. World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank 8 (1997).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 20.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id. at 11.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. ANTI-CORRUPTION WORKING GROUP, THE SOCIETY FOR ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES, BANKING
ON CORRUPTION: THE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THOSE WHO HANDLE THE PROCEEDS OF
CORRUPTION at 11 (2000).
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of large government projects such as procurement contracts of high value and privati-
sation operations.' 7 On the other hand, petty corruption occurs at the lower levels of
bureaucracy and involves corrupt payments of low value.
The harmful effects of petty corruption should not be underestimated; neither
should the size of wealth that it can generate. Because of the particular concern of
this paper, however, focus shall be placed on grand corruption involving senior officials
whose political power defeats accountability.
2. Isolated v. Systemic Corruption"8
This dichotomy is based on a test of the frequency of corrupt behaviour within a
given system. Where integrity is the norm and corrupt behaviour is rare or sporadic the
rule of law remains intact and the system remains capable of enforcing accountability
using its own institutions. Conversely, when corruption becomes endemic informal rules
replace formal ones in governing the interaction between private interests and public
bodies. 9 It is in this latter case that the rule of law suffers and the capacity of the system's
institutions to enforce it becomes limited. This specific effect of systemic corruption
makes it particularly relevant to the discussion of the role of the international community
in controlling it. It is where the national system fails to deal with the problem that the
international community's assistance becomes invaluable.
Studying the case of Asian countries, where systemic corruption was accompanied
by high growth, some commentators were inclined to argue that the harms of systemic
corruption are limited by the predictability it offers.2" Following the Asian crisis, however,
analysts have frequently suggested that systemic corruption was one of the causes of the
crisis and the consequent setback to Asian economic development. 2'
3. Domestic v. Transnational Corruption
This distinction refers to the territorial boundaries within which corruption takes
place. In the case of the former, the corrupt transaction takes place within the boundaries
of a single country. Taking bribery as the classic example of a corrupt transaction, for
corruption to be domestic both the briber and the receiver of the bribe must be citizens
of the country where the transaction took place.
17. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 27 (1999).
18. World Bank, supra note 8, at 10.
19. For an interesting discussion of the formal and informal rules, see Cheryl W. Gray, Legal
Process and Economic Development: A Case Study of Indonesia, 19 WORLD DEv. 763 (1991)
(suggesting two models for performing the functions of the legal system. One is the formal
model and the other is the informal model, then arguing that in developing countries the
informal model is predominant because of information and risk costs.).
20. This is part of a certain line of analysis that purports to prove the functionality of corruption
under certain circumstances. See generally World Bank, supra note 8, at 14-17. This line of
analysis is often traced back to J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 417 (1967). For an empirical and theoretical challenge
of Nye's thesis, see KLITGAARD, supra note 5, at 27-51 (1988).
21. See Joseph J. Norton, "Are Latin America and East Asia an Ocean Apart?" The Connecting
Currents of Asian Financial Crises, 4 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 93, at 100-01 (1998).
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Transnational corruption on the other hand occurs within more than one jurisdic-
tion.22 An obvious example of this form is when a foreign company or a multinational
company bribes a government official to secure its interest in a government contract.
Similarly, transnational corruption occurs if the bribe is given to an officer of an inter-
national organisation for a similar purpose.
Liberalisation of markets in recent years and the consequent increase in contact
between foreign capital and national governments in developing countries have multi-
plied exponentially the opportunities for transnational corruption. This and other factors
have resulted in the recent concern of the international community in the problem of
corruption in general and its transnational manifestations more specifically. This point
leads to the second question in our discussion. Namely, what is the reason for this almost
sudden international concern with the problem of corruption?
B. UNDERSTANDING CURRENT CONCERN
Three interrelated factors can be discussed in attempting to understand the inter-
national occupation with the problem of corruption. The first, which is also arguably
responsible for the other two, is the end of the Cold War. The second is the sweep of
economic liberalisation that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the third
factor, which is intellectual in nature, is a shift in the thinking and understanding of
development.
1. The End of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War has been accompanied by a worldwide exposure of
corruption scandals in both developed and developing countries. This exposure, while
it accounts in part for the attention of the international community to the problem,
remains to be explained. Analysts have addressed this question and found the answer to
lie in the unipolar nature of the post-Cold War international system.
In a bipolar international political system, corrupt regimes were tolerated and sup-
ported as a price for their loyalty.23 Following the collapse of communism and the shift
to a unipolar system this rationale for tolerance disappeared. Consequently, the interna-
tional community, assisted and encouraged by local pro-democracy movements, 4 began
to expose the corrupt governments and to demand integrity.
22. For a discussion of transnational corruption, its causes, and the problems it imposes, see
Michael Johnston, Cross-border Corruption: Points of Vulnerability and Challenges for Reform,
in CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13
(UNDP ed., 1998).
23. See Adrian Lefiwich, On the Primacy of Politics in Development, in DEMOCRACY AND DEVEL-
OPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, at 11 (Adrian Leftwich ed., 1996) ("Moreover, as the
Cold War intensified and the fear of communism grew, the US and the Western governments
seemed oblivious to the abuses and incompetence of many non-democratic governments in
the developing world. Aid and support continued to flow to them so long as they remained
loyal to US interests.").
24. Id. at 14-15.
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2. Economic Liberalisation
The end of the communist political regimes had yet another effect of bearing on
this new proliferation in corruption scandals and political concern over it. Namely, it
confirmed neo-liberal economic theory resulting in a wave of economic liberalisation
throughout the world.25 While economic liberalisation is held to be an effective policy
against corruption,26 it is also admitted that it creates a host of new opportunities for the
corrupt. National economic growth27 and contact with affluent international business"
raised the price offered for corrupt conduct. Furthermore, some liberalisation measures
such as privatisation 29 created new opportunities for corruption that did not exist under
the previous state-controlled economic systems.
The new opportunities for corruption that were created by economic liberalisa-
tion explain the arguable increase in the incidence of corruption in some transitional
economies and developing countries. This does not, however, on its own, explain satis-
factorily the international concern.
Free and properly functioning markets are at the heart of economic liberalisation.
Corruption undermines the proper functioning of the market. An obvious example is
where a private company resorts to bribery in order to obtain a government contract thus
undermining the rules of fair competition amongst the bidders." Global liberalisation of
markets has introduced foreign actors into the markets of countries that were originally
confined to nationals. This has created a multinational interest in the proper functioning
of national markets and in eliminating any distorting factors such as corruption.
Corruption also undermines national trust in the economic liberalisation process
because it diverts its benefits from the public to the private pockets of government
officials. To justify its anti-corruption initiative, the World Bank expressed similar con-
cern by stating in its policy report that "[t]here is increasing evidence that corruption
undermines development. It also hampers the effectiveness with which domestic savings
and external aid are used in many developing countries, and this in turn threatens to
undermine grassroots support for foreign assistance."
3
'
25. See id. at 14.
26. This is the view held currently by international development institutions. See, e.g., World
Bank, supra note 8, at 35-36 (arguing that deregulation and the expansion of markets is part
of the Bank's policy in helping countries combat corruption).
27. On the relationship between corruption and economic growth, see Gordon White, Corruption
and Transition from Socialism in China, 23 J. L. & Soc'v 149, 158 (1996) ("[e]conomic
growth ... may fuel corruption because it rapidly expands the incentives for malfeasance").
28. Corrupt practices of international business have attracted the attention of both researchers
and policy makers. See generally Michael Johnston, supra note 22; see also Philip M. Nichols,
Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 257 (1999).
29. Privatisation as an opportunity for grand corruption has raised a lot of concern, especially in
view of its impact on the credibility of the economic reform process. See ROSE-ACKERMAN,
supra note 5, at 35-38, 42-44 (applying economic analysis to show how privatisation can cre-
ate opportunity for corruption, then offering some policy advice on how to reduce corruption
possibilities in the privatisation process).
30. Id. at 12-13 (discussing the relationship between corruption and competition).
31. World Bank, supra note 8, at 1.
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3. Shift in Development Thinking
One commentator writing in 198832 lamented the silence of literature of interna-
tional development on the problems of corruption; he said: "Corruption is devouring
the economies and polities of many Third World nations. And yet the students of devel-
opment policy tend to ignore it."33 By mid 1990s, the question of corruption had become
widely acknowledged as a pressing developmental problem by all the international devel-
opment institutions including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the
World Bank (the Bank) and the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD)..
This focus on corruption as a development issue is not an isolated trend. It is rather
part of a general shift in development thinking. Until the 90s, development was per-
ceived as a technical process with economic liberalisation, privatisation, macroeconomic
stabilisation, and capitalisation as its means to the goal of higher GDP per capita and
better allocation of resources. 34 While these economic considerations remain relevant in
the development thinking of the 90s, other means and goals have acquired attention.
Development has come to be perceived holistically as a "transformation of society '' 31 with
structural and social concerns treated equally and contemporaneously with macroeco-
nomic and financial concerns. 36 The core of this new thinking lies in the recognition
that markets do not operate in a vacuum; they need an institutional infrastructure to be
able to function.
In the academic and policy discussion of development this institutional aspect has
been termed 'governance.' In the official pronouncements of the World Bank, gover-
nance was given a narrow technical definition. It was taken to be synonymous with
"development management" 37 and to include "building the capacity of public sector
management[,] encouraging the formation of the rules and institutions which provide
a predictable and transparent framework for the conduct of public and private business
and to promoting accountability for economic and financial performance:138 In other
development circles, especially in the Western governments' bilateral aid relations,39 gov-
ernance was given a political meaning and stretched to include the democracy of the
political system.4" It is in the context of governance as an important aspect of any devel-
opment strategy that corruption became an important issue. After all corruption is but
a form of poor governance.
As a result of these factors the international community decided to engage actively in
the fight against corruption at all levels. This has been translated into various initiatives,
some of which I will discuss in the following section.
32. KLITGAARD, supra note 5, at 7.
33. Id.
34. Joseph Stiglitz, Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies, and Processes,
Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD (Oct. 19, 1998), at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
extme/jsspO1998.htm (visited Nov. 20, 1999).
35. Id.
36. World Bank, Comprehensive Development Framework Questions and Answers, at http://www.
worldbank.org/cdf/cdf-faq.htm (visited Nov. 1999).
37. World Bank, Governance and Development 1 (1992).
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 5; see also Leftwich, supra note 23, at 16.
40. See Leftwich, supra note 23, at 15-16 (discussing the two meanings of governance).
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C. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Until the 1990s corruption was treated as an internal matter that does not justify
international intervention. Due to international developments, which were discussed in
the previous section, the 1990s have witnessed the adoption of corruption control as
an international policy goal. While the legitimacy of this policy goal remains subject
to debate,4 the practical developments in this field indicate a growing consensus to
tackle corruption internationally. This can be justified on the basis of the increase in
cross-border corruption that defeats the jurisdiction of a single country."
This section discusses a number of international initiatives to tackle corruption.
While the World Bank initiative shall be discussed as an example of the incorporation of
corruption control in development strategy, the focus shall be on treaty-based initiatives;
namely, the anti-corruption conventions of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) and the Organisation of American States (OAS).
1. The Role of the World Bank
The World Bank has been dealing with corruption since its inception. While the
1980s did witness a shift in the Bank's approach to the problem, it did not introduce the
problem of corruption as such. Until the 1990s the Bank's approach to corruption has
been indirect and implicit. This was in concord with the overall understanding of the
matter as a political and therefore internal problem. Instead of defining the problem that
the Bank confronted in implementing its projects as corruption, it used a whole set of
standard euphemisms.43 Examples of such euphemisms in a program review are: "gover-
nance problems," "unexplained cost overruns," or "excessive purchase of vehicles."" All
of the above are descriptions of what are in essence corrupt practices in the implemen-
tation of a Bank's project.
In 1992, the Bank published a report on governance and development in which it
established that "good governance is central to creating and sustaining an environment
which fosters strong and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to
sound economic policies."45 This report reflected into the Bank's work the shift in devel-
opment thinking, which was discussed above.46 In this context corruption was identified
as a governance problem and as such it was addressed in the country dialogue and
taken into account in designing structural and sectoral reforms. While this represented
a definite change in attitude towards corruption, the shift has not yet achieved its full
41. See Philip M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable Inter-
national Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? Increasing
Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 451 (arguing for the
legitimacy of corruption control as an international policy goal on basis of the threat that
transnational bribery poses to international security and discussing the counter-argument
that corruption is an internal matter).
42. See Johnston, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
43. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at xi.
44. Id.
45. World Bank, supra note 37, at 1.
46. Id. at 6-7.
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swing. The Bank was finally addressing corruption deliberately and openly but was not
yet involved directly in the fight against it.
This final twist in the Bank's role was achieved with the assumption of James D.
Wolfensohn of its presidency in 1995. The new president emphasised the problem of
corruption as a general development problem in his first speech before the Annual
Meeting of the Board of Governors in September 1995. The new approach materialised
in developing a comprehensive strategy for tackling corruption in the Bank's activities.
The Articles of Agreement imposed the first obstacle that the Bank had to deal
with in assuming its new role.47 The Bank's mandate is defined by its Articles and its
legitimacy depends on staying within its purpose as stipulated therein. The Articles do
not include corruption control within the Bank's functions. They specifically exclude
the Bank, in carrying out its functions, from having regard to "political or other non-
economic influences or considerations."48 Because of the political nature of corruption,
the issue seemed to fall squarely within the ambit of this exclusionary provision.
While corruption is political in that it involves abuse of public power; its negative
economic implications are of great concern. 49 The advocates of the Bank's involvement
in curbing corruption,5" and the Bank's itself in defending its new role,5" have placed
the emphasis on those economic implications and used them to reconcile the new role
with the Articles of Agreement.
The Bank's Articles impose on it the duty to ensure that the proceeds of its loans are
spent only for the designated purposes and that due attention is given to "considerations
of economy and efficiency "52 Corruption often diverts the proceeds of bank loans from
its designated destination to private pockets. It often affects the choice of projects replac-
ing rent-seeking potentials for efficiency and equity considerations. Therefore, corrupt
public officials would choose a project because of the opportunity for corrupt gains that
it creates instead of its economic viability and its social necessity. Such economic impli-
cations of corruption undermine the development efforts of the Bank, and reduce the
public trust in the reform process in client countries, and the willingness of the donor
countries to support the Bank's efforts especially at grassroots level. 3
The economic implications of corruption seem to suggest that the Bank shall not be
able to meet its obligations under its Articles unless it addresses corruption explicitly in
implementing the Bank-funded projects. Since specific projects can hardly be insulated
from the overall environment in which they are implemented, addressing corruption in
a more general way in the context of the overall activities of the Bank seems justified on
the same basis. That is in addition to the Bank's fiduciary obligations towards its lenders
47. See Shihata, supra note 3, at 474-77.
48. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD Articles of Agreement, art.
III, § 5(b), Feb. 16, 1989.
49. See Tanzi, supra note 7, at 22-29; see also Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, Q. I. EcON.
681 (1995).
50. Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Role of the World Bank in Controlling Corruption, 29 LAW & Pol'y
INT'L Bus. 93, 94 (1997).
51. World Bank, supra note 8, at 1, 17-19.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1.
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and donors, which impose on it the duty to secure the efficient use of the resources it
allocates for the purposes for which they were allocated. 4
The Bank's strategy is to address corruption at four levels:
5 5
* Preventing fraud and corruption within Bank-financed projects.
* Helping countries that request Bank support in their efforts to reduce
corruption.
* Taking corruption more explicitly into account in country assistance strategies,
country lending considerations, the policy dialogue, analytical work, and the
choice and design of projects.
* Adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce corruption.
In tackling the problem at all these levels the Bank remains constrained by its man-
date. Its concern with corruption is an economic rather than a political one. Therefore,
the Bank while addressing corruption in the bureaucratic management of public sector
cannot stretch its mandate to include the political regime and its democratic manage-
ment. Another limitation has been expressed by the Bank itself where it said: "though
the engagement of civil society is crucial for the long-run control of corruption, there
are obvious limits on the extent to which the Bank, as a lender to governments, can
directly support civil society's efforts to control corruption."
5 6
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the details of the Bank's efforts to
curb corruption. Therefore, I now turn to the OECD convention as one of the most
prominent international legal instruments for controlling corruption in its cross-border
form.
2. The OECD Anti-Corruption Action
The concern of the OECD with the control of corruption dates back to 1989. In
November 1997, eight years after OECD has placed this issue on its agenda, this con-
cern materialised in a multilateral convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions. In this section I shall review the history
of OECD efforts with the aim of understanding the background to the convention that
constitutes the most important legal instrument against cross-border bribery.
a. Background
Corruption is a very diverse activity with wide-ranging and pervasive harmful impact
on almost all aspects of society. Economists have developed extensive analysis of the
impact of corruption on the economic performance of society especially in the context of
economic development. Its impact on democracy and human rights has also been widely
discussed. Understanding anti-corruption activities of a certain agency must proceed
from an understanding of the reasons for its engagement and the harms of corruption
with which it is primarily concerned.5
7
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 25.
57. On the mandate of the World Bank and how it shaped its anti-corruption policy see Shihata,
supra note 3.
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The OECD concern for corruption is predominantly a concern for the impact of
corruption on competition. Through its effort in this area the Organisation aims at
securing a level playing field in the competition for world markets. Corruption has
adverse impact on competition as it replaces the highest bribe for considerations of
economy, quality and generally efficiency in the allocation of market opportunities.
In 1977, the U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which
criminalised the making of corrupt payments to foreign government officials by United
States firms and individuals. Since the United States was the only trading country to
uphold the illegality of such payments, its firms were under a competitive disadvantage
vis-A-vis other participants in the world market who were not under a similar legal
constraint. Though empirical evidence on the real impact of this situation on U.S. trade
opportunities is scant, it is largely believed to have caused U.S. firms significant loss. It
is due to this unbalanced situation and as a result of U.S. pressures that the issue of
corruption and competition found place on the OECD agenda.
The OECD anti-corruption activity tackles corruption at four different levels"8 :
* In international business transactions, where its Working Group on Bribery
in International Business Transactions has been engaged in multilaterlising the
legal action against transnational business corruption since 1989;
* In the public administration of OECD member countries through its Public
Management Service;
* In aid funded procurement projects through the Development Assistance Com-
mittee; and
* In the administration of non-member countries through the primarily research
and training activities of the OECD Development Centre.
Discussion of the initiatives of the Public Management Service, the Development
Assistance Committee or the OECD Development Centre lies beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead it will focus on the legal initiatives of the Working Group and more
specifically on the 1997 Convention on Transnational Bribery.
b. Legal Antecedents to the 1997 Convention
on Transnational Bribery
The first four years of the OECD anti-corruption activity were dedicated to research
and discussion in an attempt to reconcile the diverging views of the OECD countries
on foreign bribery. It was not until 1994 that the member countries reached their first
agreement and issued a Council Recommendation on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, which defined the framework for future initiatives. This recommendation
was followed by another in 1996 on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes of Foreign Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions. And finally in 1997, the Council issued the
Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions
that resolved several points of difference and set the ground for a multilateral convention
on transnational bribery.
58. Pauline Tamesis, Different Perspectives of International Organisations in the Fight Against
Corruption, in 129 UNDP, supra note 22, at 134.
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Considering the centrality of U.S. effort in multilaterilalising legal action against
corruption, it seems justified to view the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as
a predecessor to the OECD convention. Therefore, in this section I shall discuss the U.S.
FCPA as the earliest predecessor to the convention. I will then follow that by a discussion
of the three Council Recommendations of 1994, 1996, and 1997.
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 as a response to media exposure of corrupt payments
to senior foreign officials by major U.S. corporations such as Mobil and Lockheed.
As one author explains it: "The expanding and somewhat uncontrollable activities of
multinational corporations, the post-Watergate mood in the United States, and the moral
tone of the Carter Administration all put pressure on the U.S. Congress to enact the
FCPA."59
The Act attempts to deal with corruption of U.S. business in foreign markets. It
therefore establishes that it is a criminal offence for a "domestic concern" to bribe a
foreign official through the use of any means of interstate commerce including telephone,
facsimile or telex. The definition of a "domestic concern" delineates the scope of the
act and confines it to individuals who are citizens, nationals or residents of the United
States, and to any corporation or business association that is organised under the laws of
a state or with its principal place of business in the United States. "Domestic concern"
also includes an issuer of the securities of such an entity.
The offence takes place when the "domestic concern" pays or offers to pay money or
anything of value directly or indirectly to a foreign government official, political party,
party official, political candidate or intermediary for such a person provided that such
payment is paid or offered corruptly. This condition is satisfied if the act is carried out
with the intention of influencing an official act or official decision in a way that assists
the briber in obtaining or retaining business. In 1998, the FCPA was amended to include
any officer or employee of an international organisation in the definition of "foreign
official" for the purposes of this offence.
The Act extends the jurisdiction of the United States to foreign bribery provided it
involves a "domestic concern" and use of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
such as mail or fax. This approach is revolutionary in that anti-corruption laws and
regulations have always been concerned with controlling corruption in the country's own
administration. No attempt has thus been made at controlling corruption in another
country's administrative or political machinery.
Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International
Business Transactions 1994
In 1994, OECD countries were finally ready to reach a preliminary agreement on
tackling the problem of corruption in transnational business. This point was reached
not only as a result of U.S. pressure and continuous discussion and analysis of the
issue, but also in response to a more favourable international climate. Corruption has
59. David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New Inter-
national Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 457, 459 (1998).
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become an international policy issue, tabled by all the international and financial devel-
opment organisations. Inasmuch as this Recommendation represents consensus on tack-
ling corruption in other country's administration, it was obviously a reflection of this
international climate.
The recommendation prompted OECD countries to take concrete and meaningful
steps to combat bribery of foreign officials. It invited further discussion and analysis of
ways to tackle international corruption. It also listed the various areas of the law that
could be used for this purpose.
Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility
of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials 199660:
Tax laws were one of the areas of the law that the 1994 Recommendation prompted
OECD countries to review for the purpose of controlling corruption. Following up on
this Recommendation, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs examined the tax laws of
member countries to find that some of them allow the deductibility of bribes to foreign
officials as business costs. This tax treatment seemed to favour bribery in transnational
business and, as viewed by one author, almost amounted to government subsidy of
foreign bribery.6'
In 1996, the Council acting upon the proposals of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs
and the Committee in International Investment and Multinational Enterprises issued a
recommendation that countries that allow the deductibility of bribes to foreign officials
should revise their laws with a view to disallowing such deductibility. The Council also
instructed both the Committee on Fiscal Affairs and the Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises to monitor the implementation of the recom-
mendation and to promote a similar approach in non-member countries.
Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery
in International Business Transactions 199762:
On May 23, 1997, the Council issued a recommendation that consolidated all previ-
ous OECD legal anti-corruption initiatives and developed the consensus on the question
of criminalising the bribery of foreign officials.
The Recommendation established generally that all Member countries must "take
effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials
in connection with international business transactions." Then it went on to indicate
60. Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to
Foreign Public Officials, OECD, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, adopted on April 11, 1996, at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/tax.htm (visited in Feb. 2000).
61. Gantz, supra note 59, at 492. ("By providing firms that bribe with a tax subsidy, the affected
OECD governments have effectively been encouraging, aiding and abetting foreign bribery,
and their taxpayers are paying the cost. For example, in a situation where the corporate tax
rate is thirty-five percent and foreign bribes are deductible from taxable income as a business
expense, thirty-five out of every one hundred marks of francs used for foreign bribes is
effectively supplied by the respective governments.")
62. Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Busi-
ness Transactions, OECD, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, adopted on May 23, 1997, at http://www.
oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/revrece.htm (visited in Feb. 2000).
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the areas of the law that a Member country must examine to achieve this result, it
included: criminal law, tax laws, accounting and auditing principles, civil, commercial
and administrative laws, and principles of legal co-operation.
The Recommendation has addressed the various issues of tax deductibility, account-
ing requirements, company external audits and internal controls, public procurement,
and international co-operation. Its most important achievement, however, lies in the
area of criminal law. The Council recommended that Member countries should crimi-
nalise the bribery of foreign public officials in an 'effective' and 'co-ordinated' manner
by submitting proposals to their legislative bodies by April 1, 1998, in conformity with
the agreed common elements.
According to the OECD ministerial commitment in May 1996, 'effective criminal-
isation' meant that the criminal statutes should be up to the set standards and that in
operating together should not allow significant loopholes.63 The criminal statutes should
also establish effective mutual legal assistance. 'Coordinated criminalisation' on the other
hand meant securing broad and comparable participation by country Members.64
To achieve both effectiveness and efficiency, the Member countries worked together
for three years to develop common elements of criminal legislation and related action,
which were annexed to the recommendation. Those "common elements" constitute min-
imum standards that the Member countries must meet in developing their criminal
legislation. They included definition of the bribe, the briber, the foreign public official,
excuses and defences, basis for jurisdiction, and other related issues.
This Recommendation, as well as all the others that were discussed above, was issued
by all the members of the OECD as opposed to the secretariat of the Organisation.65
While this indicated the consensus of the Member countries, it did not change the
non-mandatory nature of the Recommendation. This was criticised by both France and
Germany who advocated a hard law approach to the question as a better tool for securing
the commitment of the members and a level playing field. The United States resented the
French and German approach as aiming at gaining time and delaying action in view of
the fact that conventions take a long time to conclude, and in the end national legislation
remains needed for their implementation.
The 1997 Recommendation constitutes a conciliatory instrument in that it sets all the
elements for a future convention, invited all Member countries to amend their criminal
legislation in accordance with those elements within a specific timeframe, and opened
the negotiation for an international convention to criminalise bribery in conformity with
the common elements. To avoid the use of this procedure to delay the action, the Council
set the end of 1997 as the date for the conclusion of the negotiation.
The Council Recommendation was acted upon and the OECD Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions was
opened for signature on November 21, 1997, thus setting a record time for the conclusion
of such a multilateral instrument.
63. Carolyn Ervin, OECD Actions to Fight Bribery in International Business Transactions, in 151
UNDP, supra note 22, at 152.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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c. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions66
The OECD Convention on Transnational Bribery was signed on December 17, 1998.
It entered into force on February 15, 1999, to become the most important legal instru-
ment against cross-border corruption. Since cross-border corruption is exercised mainly
by multinational companies operating in foreign markets, a convention that is signed by
countries that are home to the majority of such companies is more likely than any other
to have an impact on the level of cross-border corruption provided it is implemented
effectively. In the following pages I shall discuss the various aspects of the Convention.
Elements and Scope of the Offence of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials:
The Convention requires each party to render it a criminal offence "for any person
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether
directly or through intermediaries, to foreign public official for that official or for a third
party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance
of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in
the conduct of international business' 67
According to this article the Convention covers bribery very broadly to include
direct and indirect offering of pecuniary and non-pecuniary advantage. The act must
be intentional, and the intention must be directed towards influencing the performance
of the official duties in a way that is intended to secure a business advantage for the
briber. The concern of the OECD with the unfair competition element of corruption is
very obvious from this definition of the scope of the offence and its definite link with
business interests.
The Convention defines "foreign public official" to mean "any person holding a
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or
elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for
a public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international organisation."'
Efforts to include bribery of party officials along the lines of the U.S. FCPA were not
successful and this category was left outside the ambit of the offence at the risk of
rendering the criminalisation ineffective in certain situations where the bribe is funnelled
through a political party.
The briber can either be an individual or a legal person. Confronted by the problem
that some legal systems do not allow for the criminal liability of legal persons, the Con-
vention does not require the Party to alter its legal system. Instead, the Party is required
to establish whatever legal liability for such action as consistent with the principles of its
legal system. This liability is considered functionally equivalent to the liability established
by other Parties for the purposes of co-operation and mutual legal assistance. According
to the Commentaries on the Convention, it is not the purpose of the Convention to
66. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business
Transactions, OECD, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, Dec. 17, 1998, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/
nocorruption/index.htm (visited in Feb. 2000) [hereinafter OECD Convention on Transna-
tional Bribery].
67. Id. art. I(1).
68. Id. art. 1(4)(a).
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assimilate the laws of Member States on this issue; it rather seeks to "assure a functional
equivalence among the measures taken by the parties.
'69
Sanctions:
The Convention requires member parties to impose "effective, proportionate and
dissuasive"70 sanctions. The sanctions are essentially criminal in nature unless the legal
system of the member state does not apply criminal liability to legal persons. In this case
non-criminal sanctions may be applied as long as they are "effective, proportionate and
dissuasive."7
The Convention also imposes on each Party the obligation to take necessary mea-
sures to deprive the briber of the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery either through
seizure and confiscation measures or through monetary sanctions of comparable effect.72
Additional civil and administrative sanctions are optional.
jurisdiction:
The Convention incorporates jurisdiction on both territorial and nationality basis. It
obligates each party to establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign official once
the offence has been committed in whole or in part in the party's territory. According to
the Commentaries, territorial jurisdiction must be interpreted broadly as not to require
an "extensive physical connection. " "
In line with the Convention's overall approach, nationality jurisdiction is applicable
inasmuch as the country's legal system allows it and in accordance with the principles
according to which it is applied. The Convention does not require the parties to alter
the general principles in their legal systems. It does, however, require them to review
the effectiveness of their existing basis for jurisdiction and to take remedial steps where
necessary.
Safeguards:
The Convention establishes two safeguards against potential procedural abuse that
may render the Convention ineffective:
* Article 5 stipulates that prosecutorial discretion in the investigation and enforce-
ment of the bribery of foreign official shall be based on legal criteria and shall
exclude any economic or political considerations such as national economic
interest or relationships with another country.
* Article 6 provides that the application of any statute of limitation must allow
time for the investigation and prosecution of this offence. This obviously implies
taking into consideration the transnational character of the offence and the
implications that it has for the length of the procedures.
69. Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions, OECD, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, Nov. 21 1997, at http://www.
oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/index.htm (visited in Feb. 2000).
70. OECD Convention on Transnational Bribery, supra note 66, art. 3(1).
71. Id. art. 3(2).
72. Id. art. 3(3).
73. Commentaries on OECD Convention on Transnational Bribery, supra note 69, 125.
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International Co-operation:
Because the Convention deals with corruption of cross-border nature, international
co-operation in the investigation and pursuit of bribers of foreign officials is a necessity
if the Convention is to work effectively. Articles 9 and 10 provide for two essential forms
of co-operation; namely mutual legal assistance and extradition.
According to Article 9, countries are obliged to "provide prompt and effective legal
assistance" to other parties for the purpose of investigating acts that fall within the
ambit of the convention. Legal assistance often concerns the gathering of evidence for
the purpose of establishing liability for the acts covered by the Convention. This can
take the form of sharing information or facilitating the availability of witnesses or other
persons who can and consent to help in the investigation through measures that make
the temporary transfer of such persons from one country (the requested country) to
another (the requesting country) possible.
Article 9 specifically provides that mutual legal assistance shall be performed in
accordance with each country's laws and treaties. However, according to the Commen-
taries74 and the 1997 Revised Recommendation,75 parties are requested to revise their
laws and arrangements on mutual legal assistance and incorporate any means that are
likely to improve their efficiency.
The Convention tackles two possible obstacles to the effectiveness of international
co-operation and attempts to resolve them:
Countries often make mutual legal assistance conditional on the existence of
dual criminality. This creates problems where the sources of criminalisation and
the forms thereof vary from one country to another. The Convention, in an
attempt to avoid this problem, provides that the dual criminality condition shall
be deemed satisfied as long as the acts for which the application for assistance
is made fall within the scope of the offences as defined in the Convention. That
is regardless of whether the source of prohibition is a criminal statute on the
bribery of foreign officials, a criminal statute on the bribery of government offi-
cials in general or even a non-criminal statute sanctioning legal persons who
engage in corrupt practices. The latter case is specifically important in view of
the fact that the legal system in some countries does not allow for criminal
liability of legal persons. It is the approach of the Convention throughout to
accommodate differences in legal systems without requiring any change in fun-
damentals while establishing functional equivalence that renders co-operation
possible.
Bank secrecy has traditionally been an insurmountable obstacle to mutual legal
assistance. Since the offences with which the Convention is concerned are eco-
nomic in nature, such an obstacle can prove detrimental to any investigation
and prosecution. Hence, Article 9(3) provides explicitly that "a party shall not
decline to render legal assistance for criminal matters within the scope of this
Convention on the ground of bank secrecy:" [emphasis added] The specific
addition of 'for criminal matters' emphasised above poses the question whether
this is intended to exclude the functional equivalence between the criminal and
74. Id. 530.
75. Annex to the Revised Recommendation, supra note 62, 58.
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non-criminal proceedings for the acts covered by the Convention in this specific
case. In other words, would a party be able to decline mutual assistance on the
basis of bank secrecy where the proceedings are non-criminal as in the case of
the proceedings against a legal person in countries where criminal liability of
such persons is not possible according to the general legal principles?
On the question of extradition, Article 10 establishes that bribery of foreign public
officials is an extraditable offence. Where extradition is conditional upon the existence
of an extradition treaty between the requesting and requested country, this Convention
shall be deemed sufficient with respect to the offence covered by its provisions. Where
dual criminality is a condition the solution discussed above applies.
The Convention also addressed the problem of extradition of a country's own
nationals. And in that respect it imposed an obligation to prosecute or extradite upon
the parties, which means that where the laws of the country do not allow for the extradi-
tion of its own nationals, this country must take necessary measures to proceed against
the person concerned within its jurisdiction.
Monitoring and Follow-up:
The work of the OECD in controlling corruption in transnational business trans-
actions is not concluded with the entry of the Convention into force. The actual effec-
tiveness of the Convention rests on the implementation thereof by the Parties and the
operation of the resulting legislation. The drafters of the Convention were aware of this
obvious conclusion and they provided for a mechanism to meet its requirements. Arti-
cle 12 provided that the Parties must carry out "a programme of systematic follow-up
to monitor and promote the full implementation of this convention-" This programme
is carried out within the framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in Inter-
national Business Transactions.
Here I come to the end of the summary of the OECD Convention's provisions.
It is obvious from the nature of the acts criminalised by the Convention that its suc-
cess depends on the genuine co-operation between Member countries, a matter that the
Convention sought to promote through its system of international co-operation and to
enforce through its follow-up procedures. Now I move to a similar discussion of the
Inter-American Convention against Corruption as the second most important multilat-
eral legal instrument against corruption.
3. The Inter-American Convention against Corruption
In May 1992, the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States resolved
to place the issue of corrupt international trade practices on the agenda of the Organisa-
tion as one of the economic and social challenges of the 90s that it must address. 76 The
General Council justified its concern on the basis of the detrimental effects that corrupt
practices have on democracy, integral development, economic growth, and social jus-
tice. The General Assembly also expressed its conviction that corrupt practices impose
76. Resolution of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, AG/RES. 1159
(XXII-092) (May 22, 1992), at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res9/Eres1159.htm (vis-
ited in Mar. 2000).
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constraints on free trade and hence undermine investment and the flow of financial
resources.
In pursuance of this decision, the issue of controlling corruption was examined
by the various organs of the Organisation. A special working group on Probity and
Public Ethics was established and "charged with the compilation and study of national
legislation in effect with regard to matters of public ethics, the discussion of experiences
in the control and oversight of existing administrative institutions, the development of a
checklist of crimes related to public ethics as defined in national laws, and the preparation
of recommendations on juridical mechanisms to control the ... problem."77
As a result of these efforts and on the basis of a proposal by the Government of
Venezuela for an Inter-American Convention against Corruption, a draft Convention
was prepared by the Working Group on Probity and Public Ethics and adopted by
the third plenary session in Caracas, Venezuela on March 29, 1996.78 This Convention
constitutes the core of the Inter-American anti-corruption mechanism. While it precedes
the OECD Convention and actually constitutes a milestone in the multilateralisation of
anti-corruption efforts, I have chosen to discuss the OECD Convention first because of
its importance that stems from its membership and the extensiveness of its enforcement
and follow-up mechanisms. While the membership of the Inter-American Convention
is not without significance, the same cannot be said for its enforcement and follow-up
mechanisms, a point to which I will turn later on.
The 1992 decision of the General Assembly discussed above7 9 placed primary focus
on corruption in the context of international trade, which was reflected in its title "Cor-
rupt International Trade Practices." Pursuant activities by the Organisation, however,
reflected a much wider view of the problem, and a shift of emphasis to the impact of
corruption on democracy and the legitimacy of government. This was expressed in the
preamble to the Inter-American Convention where it was stated that the Member States
of the Organisation of American States are convinced that "corruption undermines the
legitimacy of public institutions and strikes at society, moral order and justice, as well as
the comprehensive development of peoples (.1" This definition of the basis for concern
had its impact on the scope of the Convention giving it a much wider focus than that
of the OECD Convention with its focus on the impact of corruption on competition in
world markets.
Elements and Scope of the Offences:
The Inter-American Convention, unlike the OECD Convention, is concerned with
both the demand and the supply side of corruption and with the national and the
transnational forms of corruption. The Convention imposes upon the State Parties an
obligation to prohibit and punish:
National acts of corruption which include the solicitation or acceptance of
bribery by a person who holds or performs a public function, the offering or
77. Resolution of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, AG/RES.
1294 (XXIV-0/94) (June 10, 1994), at http://www.oas.org/en/prog/juridico/english/ga-res97/
Eres1294.htm (visited in Mar. 2000).
78. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (March 29, 1996), at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html (visited in Mar. 2000).
79. See Resolution of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, supra note
76 and accompanying text.
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granting of bribery to such a person, any other form of abuse of public func-
tion for private gain and any fraudulent use or concealment of property derived
from the aforementioned acts.80
* Transnational bribery where the offering of a bribe is carried out by an indi-
vidual or business that is linked to its territory by virtue of nationality or
domicile.8 1
* Illicit enrichment understood as any significant increase in the assets of a gov-
ernment official that he cannot explain in relation to his lawful earnings.8 2
It should be noted that the Convention defines bribery very broadly to include both
direct and indirect offering. It also encompasses the granting of an article of monetary
value or any other non-monetary benefit. According to the Guide for the Legislator
prepared by the Inter-American Juridical Committee, indirect bribery includes bribery
offered or received through a third party whether or not that party was tied to the State
Party by nationality or domicile.8 3
The Convention defines "public function" very broadly to include "any temporary
or permanent, paid or honorary activity, performed by a natural person in the name
of the State or its institutions, at any level of its hierarchy."8 4 It defines "public official"
with comparable breadth to include "any official or employee of the State or its agencies,
including those who have been selected, appointed, or elected to perform activities or
functions in the name of the State or in the service of the State, at any level of its
Hierarchy."8 5
Acts of bribery can be performed by both individuals and legal persons. The Inter-
American Juridical Committee in its Guide to the Legislator defines legal entities very
broadly indicating that it is the intention of the Convention to include "all entities that
manage capital and labor and which could receive benefits."8 6 The Committee proposes
that governments should consider including within the definition of a legal person,
entities of corporate or non-corporate status, non-profit entities, State-owned enterprises
or companies under its control.8 7
The scope of each of the above offences is not identical. While the giving or receiv-
ing of bribery within the national boundaries must be rendered criminal whatever the
purpose of such act, transnational bribery is only criminal according to the Convention
when it is carried out "in connection with any economic or commercial transaction."8
This difference in scope is understandable in view of the rationale and purpose of each
80. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 78, art. VI(I).
81. Id. art. VIII.
82. Id. art. IX.
83. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Juridical Committee, Model Act on
Transnational Bribery: Guide for the Legislator, annexed to the Report on Model Legisla-
tion on Illicit Enrichment and Transnational Bribery, OEA/Ser.Q CJI/doc.70/98 rev. 2 (Aug.
22, 1998), at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Modelegi.htm (visited in Mar. 2000) [here-
inafter Guide for the Legislator).
84. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 78, art. I.
85. Id.
86. Guide for the Legislator, supra note 83.
87. Id.
88. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 78.
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form of criminalisation. While the main purpose of criminalising transnational bribery
is to secure a level playing field in the competition for markets, the primary purpose of
penalising bribery within a country is to protect the integrity of its government institu-
tions and equity amongst its citizens in both commercial and non-commercial contexts.
jurisdiction:
Article IV of the Convention establishes that it is concerned with corrupt acts only
when they are committed or have effect in a State Party. Applying this principle, the
Convention adopts territoriality as a basic and obligatory criteria for a State Party's
jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with its provisions.8 9 Nationality
and habitual residence are, on the other hand, proposed as optional basis for extending
national jurisdiction.90 The Convention also establishes a duty to prosecute or extradite
where the accused is present within the territory of a country whose laws prevent his/her
extradition.9'
In the case of transnational bribery, the offence can only be committed by a national
or habitual resident of the State Party or by a business domiciled therein.92 This approach
is different from that of the OECD where transnational bribery may be committed by any
person subject to rules of jurisdiction. The approach of the Inter-American Convention
was explained by the Inter-American Juridical Committee as aiming at securing "a clear
link between the active perpetrator of the crime and the legislating State"'93 and "to
avoid exaggerated or illegal extensions of the national criminal jurisdiction."94 In view
of the transnational character of corruption and the failure of some countries to enforce
their anti-corruption laws, the OECD approach that extends the jurisdiction of the State
to any act of bribing a foreign official committed within its territory seems to be more
effective as well as justified.
The principles of jurisdiction established by the Convention are not restrictive. States
are free to adopt other basis for criminal jurisdiction. The Convention endorses other
domestic rules of criminal jurisdiction with an open-ended provision to that effect. 9
International Co-operation:
The activities of the Organisation of American States in the area of controlling
corruption have always been premised on a belief that international co-operation is
essential for tackling this problem. This belief was reflected in the purposes of the
Convention. It is stipulated as one of its purposes to "promote, facilitate and regulate
co-operation among States Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to
prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the performance of public functions
and acts of corruption specifically related to such performance."96
89. Id. art. V(1).
90. Id. art. V(2).
91. Id. art. V(3).
92. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 78.
93. Guide for the Legislator, supra note 83.
94. Id.
95. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 78, art. V(4).
96. Id. art. 11(1).
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The Convention provides a number of co-operation mechanisms:
Extradition: The Convention establishes that the offences created according to its
provisions are extraditable offences, that they are deemed to be included in any
extradition treaty existing between State Parties, and that they must be included
in any such future treaty. Where extradition is conditional on the existence of
an extradition treaty, the Convention shall provide the legal basis for extradition
with respect to offences established in accordance with its provisions.
* Mutual legal assistance: The Convention imposes a duty on Member countries
to co-operate in the enforcement of domestic criminal law of corruption. This
co-operation can take place with regard to collecting evidence or any other
aspect of investigating and prosecuting corruption. Mutual legal assistance must
also be exercised in the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of
the proceeds of any of the offences covered by the Convention.
* Mutual technical co-operation: The Convention encourages mutual technical
co-operation between Member States for the purpose of devising the most effec-
tive means of preventing, detecting, prosecuting, and punishing corruption.
Technical co-operation can take the form of arrangements between the compe-
tent institutions as well as at grassroots level.
Safeguards:
The Convention provides a number of measures against possible gaps in the appli-
cation of the Convention that might render it ineffective:
* It imposes a duty on the State concerned to prosecute the accused within its
jurisdiction where extradition is not possible. This is designed to avoid the
possibility of criminals taking refuge in countries that do not have jurisdiction to
prosecute them and do not have the legal power to extradite them to countries
where such jurisdiction resides.
* To circumvent the dual criminality requirement as a hindrance to international
co-operation, the Convention provides repeatedly that where a State Party has
not criminalised one of the acts covered by the Convention it remains under an
obligation to provide assistance to other State Parties with respect to that act.
* The Convention also prevents State Parties from refusing to co-operate on basis
of bank secrecy.
Evaluation:
As I have indicated earlier, the Inter-American Convention constituted a milestone
in the multilateralisation of anti-corruption efforts. By including within its membership
both capital -exporting countries such as the United States and major capital-importing
countries such as Brazil, the Convention strikes an important balance and secures a
valuable partnership between the importing and exporting sides of bribery. However,
the failure of the Convention to incorporate any institutionalised follow-up and mutual
monitoring mechanism similar to that introduced by the OECD Convention undermines
greatly the effectiveness of the attempt. With the parallel membership of some countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States) in the OECD and the
Inter-American instruments there could be some hope in a better enforcement of the
Inter-American Convention as the pressure of the OECD mechanisms is transmitted
through this common membership.
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D. CONCLUSION
In this section I have attempted to lay the groundwork for the following discussion
by establishing a clear definition of corruption, the causes of the current concern with
the problem and the role of the international community in tackling it. It emerged from
the above expos6 that consensus has been formed to treat corruption as an international
policy concern. This consensus was reflected in the activity of almost every international
organisation including the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, the
Organisation of American States and many others. In the current work I focus on the
legal instruments against corruption. I have thus far provided a summary of two of
the main multilateral legal instruments against corruption, namely the OECD and the
OAS conventions. In the following section I will offer a similar, though more concise,
overview of money laundering and the international instruments that attempt to prevent
it and/or control it.
III. Money Laundering: Definition and Overview
A. DEFINITION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
The term 'money laundering' is of recent and debated origin. According to the
Oxford English Dictionary, the term first came into use in the mid-1970s in connection
with the Watergate scandal.97 Some have argued that it is derived from the early practice
of criminal organisations in the United States, who used to operate Laundromats as cash
intensive businesses to hide criminal wealth.9" Whatever the metaphoric source of the
term, it seems irrelevant in view of its widespread use.99 It entered legal parlance for the
first time in United States v. $4,255,625,39.1°° It has become accepted as a term of art
ever since and used extensively in the titles of relevant legislation and legal texts. It can
be found for example in the titles of the U.S. Money Laundering Control Act (1986)
and the 1990 European Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of
the Proceeds for Crime.' 0'
The concept of 'money laundering' at the current state of the art is almost open-
ended. While authors often introduce their definitions as commonly accepted, closer
inspection of the elements of these definitions immediately reveals stark and fundamen-
tal differences. This reflects different priorities and perspectives between prosecutors,
defence lawyers, intelligence agents, bankers, regulators and others who take interest in
97. JEFFREY ROBERTSON, THE LAUNDRYMEN 5 (1994).
98. Id.
99. There are similar terms in almost every language. See Ernesto U. Savona & Michael A. De
Feo, International Money Laundering Trends and Prevention/Control Policies, in RESPONDING
TO MONEY LAUNDERING: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 9 (Ernesto U. Savona ed., 1997)
("Riciclaggio" in Italian, "blanqueo" in Spanish, land] "blanchiment" in French).
100. See United States v. $4,255,625.39, 551 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (cited in WILLIAM C.
GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTERMEASURES, 23
(1995)).
101. See Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of
the Proceeds from Crime (Nov. 11, 1990), at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/141.htm [hereinafter Council of Europe Laundering Convention).
Winter/Spring 2001 109
the discussion of money laundering."°2 The difference may even be embedded in state
policy and its economic goals, which results in divergence between developed and devel-
oping countries and within each of those categories.
For the purposes of the current discussion, I define 'money laundering' as the process
of manipulating legally or illegally acquired wealth in a way that obscures its existence,
origin or ownership for the purpose of avoiding law enforcement. This definition has
four elements:
* A process or series of acts.
* A specific outcome of such process: obscuring the existence, origin or owner-
ship.
* An object of the process: illegally acquired wealth.
* Specific goal or purpose: avoiding law enforcement.
In the following few paragraphs I will discuss each of those four elements. The
discussion will show some of the different approaches to defining money laundering and
where they differ.
1. The Process of Laundering
Money laundering as I have indicated consists of a process or series of linked trans-
actions with respect to specific funds or assets for a specific purpose. The acts or trans-
actions are limited only by the purpose for which they are structured and the skill of
the launderer. There is an almost unlimited number of ways in which the launderer
can achieve his/her purpose. To make sense of this unmanageable variety in a way that
facilitates understanding and policy making, analysts reduced the process schematically
to three stages:'
0 3
* Placement: It is the first stage of money laundering where money is first brought
into the light and injected into the legitimate economy. This often happens by
placing cash into a bank, or by using bureaux de change to convert large sums
of money from one currency to larger notes in another currency hence reducing
the bulk.
* Layering: At this stage the link between the wealth and its owner or holder is
severed through a multiplicity of transactions whose primary aim is to obscure
the paper trail. Electronic wire transfers are often used at this stage with the
launderer taking advantage of the instantaneous nature of these transactions
and their daily volume. Both features make legal pursuit very difficult.
* Integration: This is the final stage, which involves re-introducing illegally derived
wealth into the legal economy after giving it an appearance of legitimacy. The
use of shell companies and fabrication of foreign and domestic loans and other
business deals are common tools at this stage.
102. David A. Chaikin, Money Laundering: An Investigatory Perspective, 2 CRIM. L. F. 467-69
(1991).
103. For an extensive discussion of the modus operandi of money laundering, see ANTI MONEY
LAUNDERING GUIDE, 55-250 to 5-450 and 556-800 to 8-350 (Barry A. K. Rider & Chizu V.
Nakajima eds., 1999).
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This schematic presentation is not watertight. Where one stage ends and another
begins is not always clear. It is also obvious that this scheme is developed with cash as
the form of illegal wealth in mind. Where the wealth generated is not in cash, the scheme
needs to be adapted if it is to be usable at all. This paradigmatic presentation remains
useful, however, in understanding a process that is so complex and heterogeneous.
2. The Outcome of the Laundering Process
Defining money laundering broadly, one can envisage several outcomes of the laun-
dering process. The launderer could seek to:
* Hide the existence of the wealth or its amount, as in the case of a tax evader
who wants to shelter his wealth from the reach of tax authorities;
* Hide its ownership, as in the case of a drug lord who wants to obscure the
money trail that might lead to his detection by severing the link between himself
and the funds through a shell company or a trust;
* Hide its disposition where the money is intended for investment in a criminal
or terrorist organisation; or
* Disguise its origin by fabricating another legitimate source of wealth.
The outcome of the laundering process depends on the purposes of the launderer
himself as well as on the law and the law enforcement in the jurisdiction where the
activity is taking place.'l 4 If the launderer aims at re-investing his illegal wealth in another
illegal enterprise, he will be keen on hiding the ownership of the money or its trail
to the illegal destination. Disguising the source and legitimising it will be irrelevant in
this case. Legitimation will also be irrelevant when the launderer invests his wealth in a
jurisdiction with lax approach to the illegality of funds.
Some commentators consider false legitimation to be a core element in the defini-
tion of money laundering,1 05 without which an operation cannot be defined as one of
laundering. This approach has a lot to commend it in terms of logical coherence and
commitment to a clear policy goal. However, it will leave outside the gamut of money
laundering control laws the majority of the acts that aim at putting wealth that is due
to the law outside the reach of law enforcement. This will defeat the purpose of money
laundering control as essentially law enforcement policy. The first to benefit from such
a narrow approach will be corrupt foreign officials who loot their countries and export
their ill-gotten wealth to where it rests out of the reach of its legitimate owners and
without any attempt at legitimising it.
3. Legally or Illegally Acquired Wealth
Concern for money laundering has originated in the context of the fight against the
drug trade and has been influenced by this context. For this reason the wealth that could
be subject to laundering has and remains to a very far degree confined to that which
is derived from a crime. Developments in money laundering control policy, however,
104. See B.A.K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime, in MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 1, at 2-3
(Barry Rider & Michael Ashe eds., 1996).
105. See Petrus C. Van Duyne, Money Laundering: Estimates in the Fog, 2 J. ASSET PROTECTION
FIN. CRIME 58, at 59-60 (1994).
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are beginning to take the definition of wealth beyond that limited scope. 10 6 With tax
authorities and anti-terrorism agencies eager to use money laundering control to enforce
their laws, the concept of wealth had to be rid of its illegitimacy requirement. Money that
is obtained by evading taxes is very often legally obtained, and money that is channelled
towards terrorism could be raised from a legitimate source.
Wealth or property must be understood very broadly to include any kind of assets.
To borrow the definition of the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs,
"Property means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or
immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title
to or interest in such assets17
4. Avoiding Law Enforcement
Any money laundering operation aims ultimately at circumventing law enforcement
and evading the reach of the law. As one commentator put it: "In other words money-
laundering is an act of accounting or fiscal act to bypass the law."'"' The purpose of the
launderer could be to avoid the confiscation of his criminal proceeds, or to avoid the
taxation of otherwise legal wealth. For those who extend money laundering to proceeds
of civil wrong, the launderer's purpose could be to avoid the enforcement of a court
ruling against his assets in a divorce case.
In my view, this specific purpose is at the core of the definition of money launder-
ing. It is the one element that distinguishes money laundering from similar acts with
comparable outcomes, which aim at achieving a business advantage without breaching
the law. Such techniques are used extensively by corporations in takeover battles in order
to hide their interests in their targeted business.
B. THE CURRENT PARADIGM OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL
The problem of money laundering was addressed in the law for the first time in the
U.S. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. A crime of money laundering did not exist until 1986,
when it was introduced in the U.S. Money Laundering Control Act (1986), and in the
U.K. Drug Trafficking Offences Act of the same year. This concern with the drug trade
and its proceeds has proved contagious and resulted, after four years of preparation, in
the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances in 1988. The Convention was the first international legal
instrument to impose an obligation on its Parties to criminalise the acts of laundering the
proceeds of drugs. This initiative was followed by several other initiatives at international
and regional levels.
The most important instrument in this respect was drafted by the Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) in 1990. The FATF was created by the G7 in
106. Some argue that money that is derived from some civil wrong could qualify for money
laundering purposes. See Barry Rider, The Control of Money Laundering: A Bridge Too Far?,
5 EUR. 1. FIN. SERV. 27 (1998).
107. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances art. l(q) [hereinafter Vienna Convention 1988].
108. Van Duyne, supra note 105, at 60.
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their Paris Summit Meeting of July 1989, to be the only international body specialising
in designing strategies to control money laundering." 9 In February 1990, the FATF
produced its renowned report, which included an assessment of the scope of the problem
and forty recommendations establishing a comprehensive strategy for dealing with it." °
The Forty Recommendations were amended in 1996 to reflect changes in the techniques
and the understanding of money laundering." 1 Despite the limited and unrepresentative
membership of the FATF and the soft nature of the recommendations, they remain at
the foundation of the existing money laundering control paradigm and have been widely
reflected in the laws of member and non-member countries.
While variations in money laundering laws still exist, and differences in implemen-
tation often accentuate them or even create new ones, one can still speak of a money
laundering control paradigm. While this can be explained to a certain degree by the
spontaneous force of imitation, it is mainly the result of taxing and deliberate efforts
of the FATF and its regional counterparts. The rationale of such efforts is a belief that
only through harmonisation and approximation of laws can the legal and regulatory
loopholes be closed against the exploitation of the increasingly transnational criminals.
Money laundering control strategy has four prongs: (1) the criminalisation of money
laundering; (2) strengthening the methods of tracing, freezing and confiscating the pro-
ceeds of illegal activity; (3) implementing regulatory tools to prevent the use of the
financial system for the purpose of money laundering; and (4) improving international
co-operation. In the following few paragraphs I will elaborate on those four aspects of
money laundering control strategies with brief reference to national differences.
1. Criminalising Money Laundering
As I have indicated above, money laundering was not considered a criminal offence
until 1986 when it was criminalised in both the United States and the United Kingdom.
In 1990, another five countries of the FATF members had already established money
laundering as a specific criminal offence; namely, Australia, Canada, France, Italy and
Luxembourg. Since those early days, the criminalisation of money laundering has spread
much further.
The paradigm definition of the elements comprising the offence remains that of the
Vienna Convention of 1988. The Convention imposes on each party the duty to estab-
lish money laundering as a crime. It is important, however, to note that the Convention
does not use the term 'money laundering' to describe the crime. The offence of money
laundering established by the Convention is very narrow in that it applies only to prop-
erty derived from drug-related offences." 2 It is very broad, however, in that it covers
any manipulation of such property whether to conceal its origin, location, disposition,
movement, ownership or any other rights with respect to the property."3 'Property' is
109. For a discussion of the background and nature of the FATF, see GILMORE, supra note 100, at
93-98.
110. See REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING (1990).
111. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, The Forty Recommendations (June 28,
1996) [hereinafter FATF Forty Recommendations].
112. Vienna Convention 1988, supra note 107, art. l(p).
113. Id. art. 3(l)(b).
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also defined very broadly to include any possible kind of asset.' 14 Such asset is to be
considered proceeds of the specified offences whether it was derived directly or indirectly
from the offence.
Since the Vienna Convention, criminalisation of money laundering has developed
beyond the scope of drug-related proceeds. It became obvious that such limitation is
neither justified nor practical. Drug trafficking is not the only serious offence that gen-
erates large criminal fortunes. Confining money laundering offences to the proceeds of
drug-related crime creates a host of practical problems and renders the law ineffective.
For example, a banker who is under a duty to report suspicion of money laundering
will be unable to report because of uncertainty about the source of suspicious funds. If
the banker reports and it turns out that the funds are not derived from a drug-related
offence he might be liable for a breach of confidentiality.
Defining the predicate offences of money laundering is a policy issue to which
countries give different solutions. While some still confine money laundering to the
proceeds of drug-related money, others extend it beyond this scope to all serious offences
or to a list of offences, which they deem most likely to result in laundering activity. In
making their decisions, countries bear certain considerations in mind. The seriousness
of the offence, the size of wealth that it generates, the involvement of organised criminal
enterprise and whether the offence threatens the integrity of the financial sector."'
Another issue that breeds differences and demands legislative decision making is the
question of the mental element of the offence of laundering. According to the general
principles of criminal justice, most notably the presumption of innocen&, the prosecu-
tion must prove that the launderer knew that the money was derived from an unlawful
activity. The prosecution must also prove that by manipulating the funds, the launderer
intended to hide its origin, nature, location, ownership or any other aspect thereof as
described in the definition of the offence. This burden of proof can be very onerous,
especially in view of the complexity of money laundering operations and the extensive
use of shell companies and bearer securities. To render this burden manageable, there
is a growing consensus to allow for the reliance on inferential evidence. This is the case
in the Vienna Convention of 1988, which provides that "knowledge, intent or purpose
required as an element of an offence set forth in paragraph 1 of this article may be
inferred from objective factual circumstances.""' 6
Money laundering often involves the use of financial intermediaries. Since financial
intermediation is often carried out by the formal financial sector in a country, concern
about money laundering has always been entwined with concern for the integrity of the
financial sector. Because of these facts the need to criminalise money laundering has
always raised the issue of corporate criminal liability. If financial institutions are to be
discouraged from getting involved in money laundering their criminal liability must be
addressed. Countries differ greatly on the question of criminal liability of corporations;
while some accept it and design sanctions that accommodate to the non-corporeal nature
of legal persons, others reject this liability on basis of the general principles of their
114. Id. art. 1(q).
115. American Bar Association Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, Money Laundering:
A Concept Paper Prepared for the Government of Bulgaria, 28 INT'L LAW. 835, 841 (1994).
116. Vienna Convention 1988, supra note 107, art. 3(3).
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legal system. The FATF, conscious of the national variations in this regard, proposed the
establishment of criminal liability of corporations for money laundering only where such
liability is acknowledged by the legal system of the country concerned." 7 This makes
corporate criminal liability a third issue that the legislature of any one country must
address in a criminal law of money laundering.
2. Strengthening the Methods of Tracing, Freezing and Confiscating
the Proceeds of Illegal Activity
According to the Vienna Convention of 1988, the FATF Recommendations, and the
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, rules and mechanisms for confiscation of
illegally obtained assets constitute a central pillar of any anti-money laundering policy.
It is often argued that inadequate provisional and confiscation measures against the
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime render money laundering control ineffective.
This is true with respect to the rules of tracing, the inadequacy of which results in failure
to identify the funds as proceeds or instrumentalities of crime, and to enforce anti-money
laundering rules and regulations. The same is true with respect to the inadequacy of
provisional measure such as freezing and seizure against the property suspected of being
laundered. Failure to impose provisional rules to prevent any further manipulation of
the funds can undermine money laundering control especially in an era of instantaneous
global money transfers.
However, where confiscation rules are drawn too narrowly as to exclude certain
profit-generating criminal conduct from qualifying as predicate for confiscation, money
laundering control not only becomes less effective but also loses part of its raison d'tre.
Money laundering control, in effect, prohibits the use of illegal gains for legal or illegal
purposes. One central rationale for this prohibition is to prevent the infiltration of the
legal economy by criminals and the consolidation of their social power. A narrowly cast
net of confiscation rules defeats this purpose and complicates the enforcement of money
laundering where the assets are actually criminal assets but nevertheless not claimed by
the state.
According to the Vienna Convention 1988, 'confiscation' means "the permanent
deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority."" 8 The Con-
vention imposes on the Parties an obligation to take any necessary measures to enable
the confiscation of proceeds of any of the offences covered by the Convention or any
instrumentalities thereof." 9 The Convention also imposes on the parties the duty to
take necessary measures to enable the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of such
proceeds or instrumentalities. 10
Countries have divergent approaches to the issue of confiscation. Systems of tracing,
freezing and seizure are also different. While they are mature in some countries they are
less so in others. Discussion of these differences is beyond the scope of this overview.
117. FATF Forty Recommendations, supra note 111, Recommendation 7.
118. Vienna Convention 1988, supra note 107, art. 1(f).
119. Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(b).
120. Id. art. 5(2).
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3. Regulatory Measures to Prevent the Use of the Financial System
for the Purpose of Money Laundering
Money laundering often involves the use of financial intermediation. Concern about
the use of the formal financial sector for money laundering purposes was amongst the
most important reasons for the emergence of money laundering control policy. Evidence
to this effect is to be found in the fact that money laundering was first tackled in the
U.S. Banking Secrecy Act of 1970, which imposed a number of regulatory reporting
requirements.
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 2 ' confirmed this concern in a State-
ment of Principles issued in December 1988. It maintained that "[blanks and other
financial institutions may be unwittingly used as intermediaries for the transfer or deposit
of funds derived from criminal activity."'22 The Committee then went on to outline basic
procedures that must be implemented by banks' managers in order to suppress the use of
the financial system for money laundering activities. These regulatory policies are often
classified by analysts of money laundering control regimes as preventive, as opposed to
control policies of criminalisation and confiscation, which I have discussed above. As
indicated by the Basle Statement of Principles, financial regulatory measures are crucial
for the enforcement of criminal and confiscatory measures.
I shall discuss the role of the Basle principles and the role of the financial sector in
the enforcement of money laundering measures in the discussion of the use of money
laundering control to curb corruption.
4. International Co-operation
International co-operation is as crucial for money laundering as it is for corruption.
Transnationalising the laundering process offers the launderer substantial benefits. It
allows him to place the assets beyond the jurisdiction of the country where the predicate
offence was committed, to benefit from jurisdictions with lax criminal and regulatory
systems, and to benefit from problems of co-operation and communication between
different criminal and regulatory jurisdictions.' 23
The FATF, aware of the transnational character of money laundering, dedicated Rec-
ommendations 30 to 40 to the question of strengthening international co-operation.
According to the FATF international co-operation in this regard has two forms, one is
administrative and the other is legal. Recommendations 30 to 32 invited the members to
establish better administrative co-operation for the purpose of improving the informa-
tion flow amongst them.'24 The purpose of this measure is to enhance the understanding
121. The Basle Committee was established in 1974 by the Group of Ten under the administra-
tive auspices of the Bank for International Settlement in Basle, Switzerland. The Committee
comprises representatives of the central banks and other financial supervisory authorities of
the eleven member countries of the G10 and Luxembourg. See, e.g., JOSEPH JUDE NORTON,
DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 175-90 (1995).
122. Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Prevention of Criminal
Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (Statement of Principles),
51 (December 1988) [hereinafter Basle Principles on Money Laundering].
123. On the global character of laundering and its benefits to perpetrators, see Savona & De Feo,
supra note 99, at 54-55.
124. FATF Forty Recommendations, supra note 111, Recommendations 30-32.
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of money laundering techniques and the size of the problem in a way that allows them
to tackle it more efficiently.
At the legal level, countries were invited to establish money laundering as a basis for
mutual legal assistance. Members were also encouraged to establish a network of multi-
lateral and bilateral agreements in this regard.12 s Co-operation is also encouraged in the
area of investigation and prosecution of money laundering offences, especially in obtain-
ing evidence in foreign jurisdiction.'26 The FATF proposed that countries should respond
expeditiously to foreign requests for identifying, freezing, seizing and confiscating the
proceeds of money laundering or any crime underlying it.' 27
Extradition was addressed in Recommendation 40, and the FATF proposed that
countries should establish money laundering as an extraditable offence under their laws
and any extradition agreements to which the country is party.128 Because of the potential
conflict of jurisdiction in money laundering, the FATF proposed that mechanisms should
be devised for "determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the interests
of justice."'2 9 The same thing was suggested for the co-ordination of confiscation of
assets, and the possible sharing of the confiscated proceeds. 3 °
C. CONCLUSION
One commentator writing about responses to the "globalization of money laun-
dering"' asserted that concern with the control of money laundering in the past
decade "has resulted in an unprecedented level of international cooperation in criminal
matters" 132 In the next part of this discussion I shall argue that attempts to control
corruption should benefit from this revolution in international cooperation by the expan-
sion of the predicate offence of money laundering to include the offence or offences of
corruption in public office.
IV. Using Money Laundering Control to Curb Corruption
A. THE RATIONALE
Maintaining secrecy has always been essential for the corrupt. Corrupt officials have
always used what we would describe today as "money laundering" mechanisms, such
as shell companies and false invoicing. One commentator describing the "techniques
of political graft"'33 included in his analysis the methods of maintaining secrecy as
125. Id. Recommendation 33.
126. Id. Recommendation 37.
127. Id. Recommendation 38.
128. Id. Recommendation 40.
129. Id. Recommendation 39.
130. Id.
131. M. Cherif Bassiouni & David S. Gaultieri, International and National Responses to the Glob-
alization of Money Laundering in RESPONDING TO MONEY LAUNDERING: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 99, at 107.
132. Id. at 107.
133. V. 0. Key, Jr., Techniques of Political Graft, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COM-
PARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 46.
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"subsidiary or ancillary techniques"' 34 thus incorporating them as essential parts in the
process of acquiring corrupt benefits.
In the current setting, using the present paradigm of money laundering control to
curb corruption derives its rationale not only from the basic characteristic of corruption
as an economic crime committed mostly for profit, but also from its modern transna-
tional character. In the following few paragraphs I shall elaborate on how anti-money
laundering measures can be used effectively to curb corruption by hitting at the core of its
economic nature and by extending the reach of national jurisdictions. The extraterrito-
riality of anti-money laundering measures will create a balance against the transnational
character of the problem of corruption.
1. Taking the Profit out of Corruption
The past two decades have witnessed a shift in crime control policy towards more
emphasis on taking the profit out of crime. It has been triggered by the perceived increase
in the profitability of criminal activity especially drug trafficking and other forms of,
often transnational, organised crime. This has resulted in a proliferation of the use of
confiscation and forfeiture mechanisms against the proceeds of criminal activity.
Corrupt officials can seek non-economic returns, such as power and favours, for
acting corruptly. However, corruption is very often exercised for the purpose of securing
economic or even pecuniary gains. The history of dictators such as President Marcos of
the Philippines and his wife can provide sufficient evidence of this reality. 3 ' Pursuing the
proceeds of corruption and confiscating them, if carried out effectively, can reduce the
incentive to act corruptly. This is premised on a belief that the individual's economic
behaviour is rational and based on a balance of interest and risk.
Anti-money laundering measures are essentially law enforcement mechanisms, the
purpose of which is to prevent criminals from hiding the illicit origin of their wealth in a
way that renders tracing and confiscation impossible. Unless corruption is acknowledged
as a predicate offence for money laundering, corrupt officials will continue to enjoy the
gains of their reprehensible and damaging conduct.
2. Following the Money Trail
Large wealth without an obvious source raises suspicion. Those who derive their
wealth from origins they are not proud to reveal are always keen on hiding it or obscur-
ing the link between the wealth and their patrimony. Criminal law enforcement agencies
became aware of the need to follow the money trail in order to detect and prosecute the
real orchestrators of the criminal activity, who never touch the illicit drug, for exam-
ple, but manage the illegal operations and then reap the benefits. Unless criminals are
prevented from hiding the money trails, this crime detection mechanism is bound to fail.
Some dictators who perform corruption on a grand scale do not care to hide their
wealth. They are content with flagrant appropriation of their country's assets and secure
134. Id. at 49.
135. The size of President Marcos' wealth can be only guessed if you know that he collected $80
million of corrupt payments from a single nuclear power contract. See PATRICIA ADAMS,
ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY
(1991) at 133.
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behind their brutal exercise of power. In most cases, however, corrupt officials need
to keep a fa~ade of propriety in order to maintain their positions. For them money
laundering becomes crucial. Even for brutal dictators, the risk of eventual revolution
induces them to seek to keep their wealth or part of it out of the reach of their defrauded
people in safe offshore money havens.
Anti-money laundering measures aim specifically at preventing criminals from
obscuring the money trail that leads to them. Creating corruption as a predicate offence
for money laundering helps prevent the corrupt from maintaining their facade of
legitimacy and expose their corruption.
3. Reaching the Extraterritorial
a. The Territoriality of Law and Regulation
The world as we know it since 1945 and the success of the decolonisation move-
ments is made of sovereign states. Each possesses exclusive jurisdiction over a specific
territory. Law has been a primary expression of this sovereignty and the result has been
deeply entrenched and strongly defended legal territoriality. Each state has authority "to
prescribe rules of law, to adjudicate legal questions and to compel, to induce compli-
ance or to take any other enforcement action"'36 primarily within their defined territory.
Exceeding the boundaries of their territory is a prima facie assault on another country's
sovereignty unless justified by the state that exercises it and accepted by the others.
Confronted by the porous nature of the world system where no country is an island
and actions taken wholly in one country have a definite impact on another, states tried
to extend their jurisdiction beyond their territories employing various means. This has
been done by loosening the territorial link upon which territorial jurisdiction is based.
In criminal law, for example, territorial jurisdiction is established over a crime if it is
committed "in whole" or "in part" within the territory of the state." 7 Territorial juris-
diction has also been extended to situations where the conduct element of the offence
has occurred extraterritorially as long as it produces serious harmful effect within the
territory. This basis of jurisdiction is described in relevant literature as "objective terri-
toriality.' 1
38
Extraterritorial jurisdiction has also been achieved through a variety of jurisdictional
bases: protective principle, nationality, universal, and passive personality. I shall give a
brief description of each of these jurisdictional bases in view of their relevance to the
control of corruption and transnational crime more generally.
The protective principle139 : According to this principle, jurisdiction over a crime is
assumed even if it does not occur in whole or in part within the territory of the state,
nor produce any physical harm within that territory provided it threatens the security,
integrity or sovereignty of that state. Typical examples of such crimes are terrorism when
it is directed against the interests of the state outside its territory and counterfeiting of a
136. Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PRO-
CEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) at 36.
137. Id. at 43.
138. Id. at 50 (this source offers extensive discussion and comparative analysis of the concept as
well as comprehensive bibliographic references).
139. Id. at 54.
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state currency. The rationale for extending the jurisdiction in such cases lies in the fact
that the state where the act took place might not be interested in prosecuting an offence
directed against the interests of another state.
40
The nationality principle4 ': According to this principle, the state assumes jurisdic-
tion over any crime committed by one of its nationals extraterritorially. The rationale for
nationality as a jurisdictional basis is again the sovereignty of the state over its citizens.
Jurisdiction based on this principle is generally accepted in international law. This prin-
ciple is useful in controlling transnational corruption where the nationals of one country
offer bribes to the officials of another as a case of increasing international concern.
Universal jurisdiction'42 : This principle grants every state the right to prosecute the
accused of certain offences of international concern. Examples of such offences are piracy,
war crimes, genocide, and hijacking of civil aircraft. Corruption is not yet considered to
be of sufficient threat to the international order so as to merit universal jurisdiction.
Passive personality principle4 ': This principle gives the state a claim to jurisdiction
over crimes committed against one of its citizens. Because corruption is a crime where
a specific victim is hard to define, the passive personality principle is irrelevant to our
current discussion. 1
44
b. Corruption as a Challenge to Territoriality
When we speak of transnational crime we are often speaking of a crime the con-
stituent elements of which took place across the boundaries of several states. A textbook
example of such crime would be when a "defendant shoots a gun in Italy, wounding
a person in France, who travels to Switzerland where he succumbs to his wounds."'
14
A crime that has an actual territorial link with several states is a transnational crime
in strict sense. However, there are other situations in which the crime is committed
entirely within the boundaries of a single state while its impact is felt in other states
or within the international community as a whole. In the latter case the transnation-
ality of the impact raises and justifies international concern. Whether we are speaking
of transnational crime in strict sense, or of crimes that have transnational impact, the
territoriality of the law becomes an obstacle in the way of effective protection of national
and international order.
Corruption has many different forms and bribery is its most common example.
Some crimes of corruption are transnational in strict sense; for example, when the citizen
of one country offers the official of another country a bribe if the offer is made in the
country of the briber and the bribe is delivered in the country of the bribee. In this case
the bribery is clearly transnational and both states can claim jurisdiction should the act
be criminal in both of them. Territoriality in the present example is not an obstacle to
establishing jurisdiction. Co-operation is, however, needed for the effective investigation
140. David Chaikin, Extraterritoriality and the Criminalisation of Foreign Bribes, in CORRUPTION:
THE ENEMY WITHIN (Barry Rider ed., 1997) at 293.
141. See Blakesley, supra note 136, at 61.
142. Id. at 70-81.
143. Id. at 67-70.
144. See Chaikin, supra note 140, at 295.
145. Blakesley, supra note 136, at 47.
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and prosecution of the offence. In the same example, if the whole conduct took place
in the country of the bribee, the situation becomes more problematic. The crime is no
longer a transnational crime in strict sense. For states to establish their jurisdiction over
such an offence, they must first establish that it is a criminal offence to bribe a foreign
public official, and then apply the nationality principle to extend their jurisdiction to
their nationals when they bribe foreign officials abroad.
In 1977, the United States introduced the FCPA, prohibiting its nationals from brib-
ing foreign public officials. 4 6 Until recently, the United States was the only country to
impose such a prohibition, thus creating a competitive disadvantage for its national busi-
ness in the race for a share in the international market. Under this situation, corruption
exercised by nationals of other countries and foreign public officials had a harmful
impact on the interests of the United States. Neither territoriality principle, nor any other
conventional principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction could justify the extension of the
jurisdiction of the state concerned about such corrupt practices.
The territorial nature of the law is further challenged in the context of development
aid. The challenge arises when the donating country or international organisation gives
the loan or the grant to a recipient government for the latter to manage its disposition.
If the recipient government is corrupt the fund might be misappropriated. Alternatively,
the corrupt government might choose to implement the funded project while accept-
ing bribes in the procurement process. Where the bidders are national enterprises, the
corruption will be strictly internal. However, the funds dispensed corruptly are of for-
eign origin, which creates an interest for the donating state, and the taxpayers therein,
in seeing that the funds are dispensed efficiently and equitably.
It could be argued that the only check on the recipient government in the develop-
ment aid case should come from the lenders or donors themselves. The reality is that
donors until recently often turned a blind eye. In 1990, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank lent $250 million to the Yacyretd hydro dam on the Parand River between
Argentine and Paraguay.'47 The decision of the Bank was taken despite the long history
of misspending in the implementation of this project and the call of Argentinean Presi-
dent Menem to cancel the dam project as a "monument to corruption."'48 This attitude
by donors and lenders leaves unprotected the interests of the taxpayers and grassroots
donors.
A final challenge to legal territoriality is posed by the practice of corrupt officials,
especially corrupt heads of state and high-level politicians in developing countries, who
appropriate their country's assets and expatriate it to offshore financial centers. According
to an investigation by the Nigerian government, it was established that in 1978 corrupt
officials expatriated $25 million a day.'49 Another commentator reported that "[w]hen
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed, the revolutionary government reportedly
found among his personal papers a letter from his Swiss bankers asking him to hold
off shipping gold bars, for they had run out of storage space."5 0 Similar accounts were
146. See supra section II.C.2.b. discussion in U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
147. ADAMS, supra note 135, at 142.
148. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSY-
CHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, Dec. 19, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/15, 28 I.L.M. 497.
149. Id. at 136.
150. R.T. NAYLOR, HOT MONEY AND THE POLITICS OF DEBT 237 (1987).
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made of Zairian Dictator 'Mobutu" whose Swiss, Belgian and French bank deposits were
estimated at about $5 billion. l15
Stories of such expatriation abound. In the context of the current discussion they
serve to prove the inadequacy of the territoriality principle under contemporary global
conditions. Money can be transferred from one end of the globe to the other with
the press of a button. According to strict application of the territoriality principle, the
stories of corruption referred to above are strictly internal and, therefore, beyond the
jurisdictional reach of any other country. However, when one considers the people's lack
of capacity to enforce the rule of law against the corrupt in these looted countries, and
compare the size of this corrupt wealth to these countries' foreign debt, international
co-operation based on the rule of law, not political convenience, becomes a necessity.
c. The Extraterritorial Reach of Money
Laundering Control Measures
The crime of money laundering extends the reach of criminal law beyond the terri-
torial boundaries of the state. Criminal law proscribes money laundering in an increas-
ing number of countries. Money laundering presupposes the occurrence of a "predicate
offence" whose proceeds are being laundered. The predicate offence could have been,
and probably more often is, committed within the state where the laundering is taking
place. Should the 'predicate offence" however, be committed within the territory of any
other state the precondition for money laundering would still be satisfied. Prosecuting
money laundering in the latter case will automatically extend the jurisdiction of the
court to the 'predicate offence.' A conviction for money laundering might even result in
the confiscation of the laundered funds and thus impose penalty on a person for an act
that originally lied outside the jurisdiction of the state.
The Vienna Convention of 1988 imposes a duty on the Parties to criminalise the
laundering of the proceeds of drug-related offences. It is, however, silent on the question
of the location of the predicate offence. According to the commentaries "it would accord
with recent practice if implementing legislation were to reflect the possibility that the
predicate offence was located in a State other than the enacting one."15 2 On the ques-
tion of confiscation, the Convention provides that states must enable the confiscation
of the proceeds of all the offences established by the Convention, including those of
money laundering. The Convention, however, is silent on whether this would include
the laundered funds as well as the profit derived from the laundering service where the
prosecution is for the offence of laundering only.
The Council of Europe Convention of 1990, on the other hand, establishes the
extraterritorial reach of money laundering control explicitly. After imposing the obliga-
tion on each Party to establish money laundering as a criminal offence, the Convention
goes on to stipulate that, "it shall not matter whether the predicate offence was subject
to the criminal jurisdiction of the Party "' 53 It is not, however, clear whether the funds
151. Id. at 239.
152. COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NAR-
COTIc DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, at 13.44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/590, U.N. Sales
No. E.98.XI.5 (1988).
153. Council of Europe Laundering Convention, supra note 101, art. 6(2)(a).
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laundered shall be confiscated in this case as proceeds or instrumentalities of money
laundering offence.
According to the U.K. law on money laundering, criminal conduct as a precondition
for money laundering is defined very broadly to include any act that constitutes one of
the predicate offences for money laundering under the law, or would constitute such an
offence if committed in the United Kingdom.'54 The law does not require that the act
should constitute a criminal offence in the country where it was committed.
This extension of criminal jurisdiction can be most valuable in curbing corruption.
As one commentator puts it albeit in slightly different context: "The deterrent effects
of a criminal law increase where the jurisdictional net is expanded.'' 5 In the following
section, I shall review the various money laundering control and anti-corruption instru-
ments to see how far corruption constitutes a predicate offence for money laundering.
B. THE PRESENT LAW
In this section, I will review the anti-money laundering instruments and anti-
corruption instruments to see whether the former establish corruption as a predicate
offence for money laundering and whether the latter consider criminalising the launder-
ing of the proceeds of corruption as a tool towards curbing it.
1. Money Laundering Instruments
Recommendation 4 of the FATF Forty Recommendations on the subject is dedicated
to the definition of the criminal offence of money laundering. In the 1990 version of that
Recommendation, the FATF focused on the criminalisation of drug money laundering.
The FATF was, however, conscious of the evidentiary difficulties inherent in such a nar-
row definition and of the link between drug trafficking and other criminal activities. For
this reason it recommended that states should consider extending the predicate offence
to include "all serious offences, and/or all offenses that generate a significant amount
of proceeds, or certain serious offenses."'5 6 In 1996, the FATF Recommendations were
revised in view of developments in money laundering typologies. Recommendation 4
was amended and countries were specifically advised to extend the predicate offences to
serious offences. Each country was allowed the freedom to determine what offences were
to be defined as serious for the purposes of money laundering legislation.
The Council of Europe Laundering Convention of 1990 defines the predicate offence
very broadly to include "any criminal offence as a result of which proceeds were generated
that may become the subject of [laundering]."' The wording of the Convention and the
Explanatory Report do not leave scope for national variations in this regard. While the
FATF approach leaves choice to national legislatures to include or exclude corruption as
a predicate offence for money laundering, the approach of the Council of Europe does
154. ANTI-CORRUPTION WORKING GROUP, supra note 16, at 35-36, 7.1 & 7.2.
155. David Chaikin, supra note 139, at 286 (the author is arguing for the criminalisation of the
bribery of foreign public officials).
156. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Interpretive Notes to the Forty Recommen-
dations, at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.
157. Council of Europe Laundering Convention, supra note 101, art. l(e).
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not seem to give such choice. Corruption is definitely a crime that generates economic
benefits and therefore is a predicate offence for money laundering.
Looking into U.K. law as an example of a national approach to the question, we
find that section 93A of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 extends the predicate offence
of money laundering to include any criminal conduct which constitutes an offence tri-
able on indictment in the Crown Court. Accordingly, offences of corruption, wherever
committed, are predicate offences for money laundering under U.K. law.
2. Anti-Corruption Instruments
a. The OECD Convention on Transnational Bribery
The OECD Convention, as explained above, ' deals with the problem of bribery of
foreign public officials. Its scope as defined in article (1) is confined to the supply side of
bribery; that is, to the briber. The Convention, therefore, does not deal with the corrupt
foreign official who is the recipient of the bribery.
Money laundering is addressed in article 7 of the Convention. According to this
article, "[ejach party which has made bribery of its own public official a predicate offence
for the purpose of the application of its money laundering legislation shall do so on
the same terms for the bribery of a foreign public official, without regard to the place
where the bribery occurred.' 5 9 It would be consistent with the scope of the Convention
as described in article 1 to interpret this provision as applying to the proceeds that the
briber accrues from the bribery and not to the bribe that the foreign official receives.
However, the wording of the provision and the Commentaries to the Convention both
indicate a broader definition of the predicate offence.
According to the Commentaries, bribery of foreign public officials must be treated
as equivalent to the bribery of national officials for the purposes of money laundering
legislation in each Party's jurisdiction. Therefore, if the receipt of bribery is established as
a predicate offence for money laundering within a certain jurisdiction, the Convention
requires that the laundering of the bribe payment that is made to the foreign official
should be subject to money laundering legislation. This understanding is confirmed by
article 3(2) of the Convention, which provides that "[e]ach Party shall take such measures
as may be necessary to provide that the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign
public official, . . . are subject to seizure and confiscation."' 60 [emphasis added]
While the Convention leaves it to the discretion of the national legislature to take
such approach, it is obvious that it intends to utilise money laundering control to extend
the reach of its anti-corruption regime beyond the territories of its Member States. This
intention is made clear by the emphasis in article 7 that it should apply "without regard
to the place where the bribery occurred."' 6 '
b. The Inter-American Convention against Corruption
Under the Inter-American Convention all parties are required to establish as criminal
both the offering and receiving of bribery where the party's public officials are concerned.
158. See supra section II.C.2 discussion on OECD Convention.
159. Council of Europe Laundering Convention, supra note 101, art. 1.
160. Id. art. 3(3).
161. Id. art. 7.
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On the other hand, the obligation to establish bribery of foreign public officials as an
offence is subject to the "Constitution and the fundamental principles of [each Party's]
legal system.' ' ' 6 Thus, the scope of the Convention extends to both active (the briber)
and passive bribery (the bribee), and to both national and transnational bribery.
The Inter-American Convention places more emphasis on the proceeds of crime
than does the OECD Convention. Taking the proceeds out of corruption is part of the
rationale for the Inter-American co-operation as stated in the Preamble to the Conven-
tion.163 This can probably be explained by the link between corruption and illicit drug
trade in the region. According to the Preamble the State Members are "[d]eeply con-
cerned by the steadily increasing links between corruption and the proceeds generated
by illicit narcotics trafficking.'
64
As a result of this emphasis, the Convention treats the laundering of the proceeds of
national bribery, as opposed to transnational bribery, as a corrupt act in its own right.
Article VI of the Convention stipulates that:
"This Convention is applicable to the following acts of corruption:
d. The fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any of the acts
referred to in the article;"'
' 61
It is not clear from the provisions of the Convention whether the laundering offence
is intended to extend to predicate offences of corruption that are committed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the state where laundering is taking place. The Convention
accepts territoriality and nationality principles as minimum bases for jurisdiction. 66 It
also emphasises that the Convention applies only where the "alleged act of corruption
has been committed or has effects in a State Party."'167 It could be argued that laundering
the proceeds of an extraterritorial act of corruption within the territory of a party state
extends its effect to that state. It must be noted, however, that the Convention does not
address the laundering of the proceeds of transnational bribery; that is, the bribery of
foreign public officials.
So far I have argued that extending the predicate offence of money laundering to
include corruption offences will allow anti-corruption efforts to benefit of the anti-
money laundering mechanisms. One important benefit is the extraterritorial reach of
money laundering, which will allow anti-corruption efforts to reach into the territories
of highly corrupt officials and impose checks on their corrupt practices on behalf of their
countries' victimized peoples. Now I will turn to the role of financial institutions in this
162. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 78, art. VIII.
163. The Preamble states that the Member States are "[clonvinced of the need for prompt adoption
of an international instrument to promote and facilitate international cooperation in fighting
corruption and, especially, in taking ... appropriate measures with respect to the proceeds
of such acts." Id. at Preamble.
164. Id.
165. Id. art. VI(I).
166. Id. art. V(1).
167. Id. art. IV.
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effort. My aim is to illustrate how the financial regulatory aspects of money laundering
control can be useful in enhancing the efforts against corruption.
The extraterritoriality of the criminal law of money laundering that I have illustrated
earlier is paralleled by similar regulatory extraterritoriality, which is equally beneficent
in dealing with corruption. The following section will also illustrate the difficulties that
extraterritoriality imposes on financial institutions.
C. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Secrecy is essential for corruption. To maintain it the corrupt official needs to hide
the proceeds of his illegal practices. Money laundering is the mechanism by which the
proceeds are hidden or legitimated. Financial intermediation that is committed to secrecy
is, thus, essential for both corruption and money laundering. In this section, I will
discuss the role of financial institutions in the control of corruption and the difficulties
that it imposes on them.
1. Bank Secrecy Reconsidered
Those who view it suspiciously call it "bank secrecy,"' 68 while those who cherish it
call it "duty of confidentiality of banks."'69 Whatever it is called, it can be defined as
"the obligation of a financial institution, and of its officers and employees, to protect
and withhold information acquired while handling a client's business."'7 ° The origin
of bank secrecy is also debated. Advocates argue that this duty is "as old as banking
institutions themselves,"'"' and that it existed in one form or another throughout the
history of these institutions.'72 Opponents of bank secrecy, on the other hand, argue
for the historical contingency of this practice. They link it instead to the political and
economic circumstances of the era between the two World Wars. While the advocates'
arguments that bank secrecy is old and universal pose financial privacy more as a natural
right, the arguments of the opponents for historical contingency open the door for
limiting the scope of secrecy on account of technological, economic and political changes.
Whatever the history of financial confidentiality in banking practices, it was not until
the 1930s that bank secrecy became institutionalised as a matter of public interest.'73
Before the 1930s, commitment to confidentiality was based on commercial customs,
internal regulations of the old western banks and the Civil and Commercial Codes. 74
168. Richard T. Preiss, Privacy of Financial Information and Civil Rights Issues: The Implications for
Investing and Prosecuting International Economic Crime, in MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL,
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In 1934, Switzerland passed its Federal Banking Law rendering it a criminal offence
punishable by imprisonment to violate bank secrecy."' This shift was triggered by the
need of Switzerland to maintain its neutrality as well as its national sovereignty against
the intrusion of the Nazi government in Germany." 6 In the 1920s, the Nazi govern-
ment began its persecution of the Jews and as a result money flooded out the country
seeking refuge in neutral Switzerland. In an attempt to restore the fleeing capital, the
Nazi government sought financial information in Switzerland and exerted pressure on
employees of financial institutions, which resulted in the 1934 consolidation of the duty
of confidentiality and the aggravation of penalties for any breach thereof."'
Several rationales have been offered to justify bank secrecy. It has been argued that
bank secrecy serves a personality right in financial privacy, that they are analogous to
client-lawyer or doctor-patient privileges, that they help the individuals against unfair
tax systems, or that they .give financial refuge for those who are being persecuted on
religious, political or racial basis. 178 Each of those arguments has been debated vigorously
by opponents of the practice. 179 The twin-pillars of bank secrecy, however, remain those
that resulted in the Swiss Federal Banking Law, that is, state sovereignty and individual
rights.'80
Social change catalysed mostly by technological developments have weakened the
state, rendering it unable to maintain law and order within its territory without the
help of other actors in the international and global arenas. This has resulted in erosion
of the concept of sovereignty in its traditional sense. It also resulted in the emergence
of individuals or groups of individuals, for example, multinational corporations and
criminal organisations, that are more powerful than the single state or at least capable
of undermining its capacity to control them. In this context it was natural that bank
secrecy, as a practice rooted in state sovereignty and the defence of a weak individual
against the powerful state, should come under attack.
In the BCCI and the Barings cases, this change in the global condition has been
clearly illustrated. 181 In the BCCI case, bank operations in Grand Cayman and Lux-
embourg were controlled from an office in the City of London. In the Barings case, a
trader's 'gambling' in Singapore was funded by the Bank's head office in London. So
in both cases cross-border operations took place with the benefit of instantaneous wire
transfers. And in both cases bank secrecy laws excluded supervisory authorities in all
175. Id.
176. Id. at 334.
177. Id. at 336. But cf NAYLOR, supra note 150, at 233-34 (arguing that the Federal Banking Law
was actually a response to the tight fiscal controls imposed by France on its people and an
attempt to attract the pursuant flight of capital to Swiss Banks).
178. George J. Moscarino & Michael R. Schumaker, Beating the Shell Game: Bank Secrecy Laws and
Their Impact on Civil Recovery in International Fraud Actions, in CORRUPTION: THE ENEMY
WITHIN, supra note 140, at 303, 315-17 (offering a brief discussion of the justifications for
bank secrecy and the counter-arguments).
179. Id.
180. See Preiss, supra note 168 (arguing that bank secrecy is really about state sovereignty more
than it is about individual rights).
181. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Breaking the Billion Dollar Barrier: Learning the Lessons of BNL, Daiwa,
Barings and BCCI, in CORRUPTION: THE ENEMY WITHIN 113, supra note 140, at 124.
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the countries' involved from discussing their suspicions and sharing information on the
suspicious transactions."5 2 This fact accounts at least partly for the delay in tackling the
problems, which resulted in the collapse of both institutions and the loss of depositors'
money as well as threatening a systemic crisis.
Even jurisdictions most committed to bank secrecy became aware, either voluntarily
or through international pressure, of the criminal use of the financial system and the
threat that it poses in terms of law and order. This was reflected in the proliferation
of bilateral and multilateral instruments that are designed to facilitate international co-
operation in penal matters, and to limit the hindering effect of bank secrecy. In 1996,
the United States alone has entered into twenty-three Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
with other countries."3 Both anti-money laundering and anti-corruption international
instruments reflected this shift. It has become standard in all such instruments to stip-
ulate "A Party shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance ... on the ground of
bank secrecy."'84
The Basle Committee and the FATF addressed in detail the question of preventing
the use of financial institutions for criminal purposes. In doing so their aim was to
design a regulatory framework that redefines bank secrecy in a way that does not hinder
international co-operation in both supervisory and criminal matters. I shall discuss this
regulatory framework in the following section.
2. Financial Regulations against Money Laundering
In 1988, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision issued a statement of general
principles that financial institutions should implement to guard against the use of the
banking system for the purpose of money laundering.s The Principles are not legally
binding, and their implementation depends on national practice and law. 6 The pri-
mary function of banking supervision is to "maintain the overall financial stability and
soundness of the banks." '187 In justifying its concern with money laundering and the
competence of national supervisory authorities with respect to this issue, the Committee
provided that concern with the criminal use of the financial system falls within the scope
of this primary function. According to the Committee, association with criminals can
undermine financial stability by exposing the banks to adverse publicity that weakens
public confidence, or to direct losses from internal or external fraud.
The FATF took up the task of elaborating the role of financial institutions in control-
ling money laundering. It dedicated Recommendations 9-29 to the enhancement of this
182. Id.; -see also Preiss, supra note 168, at 347-50, for a discussion of a hypothetical case illustrating
the difficulties that bank secrecy poses in any cross-border investigation seeking financial
information.
183. Mathew S. Morgan, Money Laundering: The United States Law and Its Global Influence, STUD.
INT'L FIN. & ECON. L., at 42 (1996).
184. Vienna Convention 1988, supra note 107, art. 7(5); see also OECD Convention on Transna-
tional Bribery, supra note 66, art. 9(3); Council of Europe Laundering Convention, supra
note 101, art. 18(7); Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 78, art. XVI.
185. Basle Principles on Money Laundering, supra note 122.
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role covering a broad spectrum of issues, from internal controls within the Banks, intro-
ducing new regulatory obligations or criteria, to proposals to reshape bank secrecy in a
way that facilitates financial investigations. I shall now address the different aspects of
the regulatory regime established by the Basle Principles and FATF's Recommendations.
a. Access to the Financial Market
The FATF provided in Recommendation 29 that "[t]he competent authorities regu-
lating or supervising financial institutions should take the necessary legal or regulatory
measures to guard against control or acquisition of a significant participation in financial
institutions by criminals or their confederates."' 8 This obligation falls squarely within
the competence of banking supervisory authorities, which must scrutinise the applicants
for authorisation to conduct financial activity. The rationale behind this stipulation is
that allowing criminals to own or control banks is the best way to facilitate their money
laundering activities as illustrated in the BCCI case. Money laundering control depends
to a very far degree on the internal corporate control; if the owners of the organisation
are corrupt, such control will be absent. And if the infiltration of the financial institu-
tions by criminal elements becomes endemic, money laundering control can be rendered
totally ineffective.
b. Know Your Customer
Financial institutions are required to satisfy themselves as to the identity of their
customers. This applies whether they are dealing with occasional or usual customers.
Identification must be established by official or any other satisfactory documents. This
requirement aims at enabling financial institutions to screen their customers to avoid
dealings with criminal elements. It also aims at creating a paper trail that facilitates
investigations by law enforcement authorities.
According to this requirement, banks are no longer allowed to hold anonymous
accounts. Where the institution suspects that the customer is just a nominee account
holder who is holding the account on behalf of another, or where the account holder is
a company, the financial institution must satisfy itself as to the identity of the principals
on whose behalf the transactions are being conducted.8 9
c. Transaction Reporting
Financial institutions are required to report certain transactions to designated per-
sons or authorities. The reporting requirement proposed by the FATF is based on criteria
of suspicion. Suspicion can stem from the nature of the transactions if they are complex,
unusual, and "have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose"" 0
Some countries impose an objective reporting requirement based on the size of
the transaction and without any suspicion requirement. This approach has been imple-
mented in the United States and Australia, and was rejected by the United Kingdom as
likely to result in excessive reporting that overburdens the law enforcement agencies.
188. FATF Forty Recommendations, supra note 111, Recommendation 29.
189. Id. Recommendations 12 & 13.
190. Id. Recommendation 14.
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d. Record Keeping
The primary purpose of the anti-money laundering regulatory regime is to maintain
the money and paper trail visible in a way that facilitates the investigation of crime. To
achieve this purpose, financial institutions are required to keep records of the identities
of their customers and the reports of suspicious transactions. The records must be "suf-
ficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and
types of currency involved if any)."' 9' The institutions are required to make the records
available to competent authorities upon request.
The effectiveness of these regulatory requirements has been largely debated and the
burden they place on the financial institutions in what seems more like a police function
has been also widely discussed. Both issues are beyond the scope of this discussion.
3. Extraterritoriality of Anti-Money Laundering Regulations
Regulatory extraterritoriality can be achieved through two methods. One is by direct
imposition of the regulatory requirements on institutions that are not subject to the reg-
ulatory jurisdiction of the state concerned. The other is by exerting pressure on another
state to implement anti-money laundering regulatory requirements even though it does
not perceive them to be in its best economic interest. Both methods were envisaged by
the FATF in its Recommendations. Recommendation 20 required the financial institu-
tions to ensure that anti-money laundering mechanisms are "applied to branches and
majority owned subsidiaries located abroad, especially in countries which do not or insuf-
ficiently apply [FATF] recommendations."19 2 [emphasis added]
By imposing this requirement on the financial institutions in countries that apply the
FATF Recommendations, the FATF actually extends the scope of the Recommendations
territorially. It also provided in Recommendation 21 that special attention should be
given by financial institutions in any transactions with persons or entities from countries
that do not apply the Recommendations. In view of the interdependence of financial
markets, strict application of this Recommendation will result in placing pressures on
states to implement the Recommendations in order to maintain their access to the global
financial market.
The United States serves as an illustrative example of the extraterritorial reach of
anti-money laundering regulations. The U.S. Bank Secrecy Act applies equally to U.S.
banks and to foreign banks operating within the jurisdiction. U.S. regulators, unless
denied access by the host country, will examine branches of U.S. banks that are operating
abroad.'93 U.S. banks may be denied the authority to open a branch in a country that is
uncooperative and does not have a satisfactory anti-money laundering mechanism.
1 94
The criminal law of money laundering extends the regulatory framework further to
cover financial institutions that are neither branches of U.S. banks nor operating within
the United States. The U.S. criminal jurisdiction extends to offences that are committed
in whole or in part within its borders. Because of the very fluid nature of the actus reus
in money laundering, this territorial link to the U.S. jurisdiction can be stretched very
191. Id. Recommendation 12.
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far. For example, if illicit money was wired through a U.S. bank as part of a cross-border
process of laundering, this transit will be sufficient to give the United States criminal
jurisdiction over the whole process of laundering. Any foreign bank involved in this
process shall thus be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the US.
The case of Banque Leu is an illustrative example of the extraterritorial reach of the
U.S. criminal law and how it leads to the extension of its regulatory system extraterrito-
rially.' 9' Banque Leu was a Luxembourg bank that had no offices in the United States.
In 1993, it entered a guilty plea to money laundering in the United States and agreed
to forfeit $2.3 million to the United States and $1 million to Luxembourg. 196 The bank
was charged with money laundering under U.S. law because it accepted deposits of $2.3
million in the form of cashiers checks drawn on banks operating there, which formed
part of the money laundering operation initiated in the United States. 197 The bank sent
the checks to the United States to clear them, and on basis of this action fell under
the country's criminal jurisdiction. This clearly demonstrates how the loose definition
of the actus reus in money laundering can result in extending the territorial jurisdiction
of the state. As one author commenting on the case put it: "Acceptance of U.S. dollar
negotiable instruments by a bank anywhere in the world outside of the United States
renders the bank susceptible to U.S. criminal jurisdiction in the money laundering area
because all such instruments must necessarily clear through the United States."'98
What is of more interest in the current context is the fact that in addition to the
forfeiture agreement, the bank agreed to submit to a three-year U.S. audit specifically for
money laundering.'99 It also agreed to produce an anti-money laundering monograph
that should be updated annually for two years.200 Such regulatory requirements were
imposed as a form of sanction for criminal conduct on a bank that was not regulated
by the United States, hence, extending the U.S. regulatory jurisdiction extraterritorially.
The extension of the regulatory jurisdiction in the case illustrated above was tem-
porary and specific. The extraterritoriality of the criminal law of money laundering,
however, has a more durable effect on the scope of anti-money laundering regulations.
Foreign institutions and countries wishing to avoid prosecution for criminal money laun-
dering and its devastating effects2' must show good record of fighting against money
laundering. The history of a country's handling of the money laundering problem, and
195. For a discussion of the case, see Kirk W. Munroe, The Extraterritorial Reach of the United
States Anti-Money Laundering Laws, in MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, supra note 104, at
290, 300-03.
196. Id. at 300.
197. Id. at 301.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 302.
200. Id.
201. Within ten days of the indictment of Banco de Occidente (Panama), the United States man-
aged to freeze $80 million of the bank's assets worldwide. This amounted to over half of
the bank's total assets and resulted in its being placed under the control of the Panamanian
Banking Commission. See Munroe, supra note 195, at 299.
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the internal controls of a foreign financial institution are relevant factors in determining
the occurrence and the outcome of a prosecution under U.S. money laundering law.2" 2
In the case of the Banco de Occidente the reputation of the bank's owners and
management have resulted in a lenient outcome of the indictment for money laundering
offences under U.S. law. 0 3 Initially, the prosecution sought a total of $824 million in
forfeiture and civil penalties.20 4 This amounts to seven times the total assets of the bank,
which would have led to its bankruptcy had it been imposed. Instead, the indictment
was settled by a guilty plea and an agreement to forfeit $5 million over a period of four
years. 2 5 This much more lenient settlement, which allowed the bank to survive, was
largely due to the reputation of its management and owners.
4. Extraterritoriality as a Problem
Criminal and regulatory extraterritoriality impose serious problems for financial
institutions. The regulatory extraterritoriality creates conflict between the laws and regu-
lations of the country under which the bank is regulated and the laws and regulations of
the country that is exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, the extraterritorial
application of the law of one country might impose on a bank a duty to report certain
transactions while the home country's laws and regulations prohibit such reporting on
basis of strict bank secrecy. In this case the bank will be in the unfavourable position of
having to breach the laws of one country or the other and bear the consequences.
In anticipation of such a possibility the FATF recommended that in this situation the
financial institution should not breach the home country's regulation; instead it should
inform the extraterritorial jurisdiction that compliance is not possible under the local
laws and regulations. 26 The solution contemplated by the FATF has not always been
applied. Some U.S. courts enforced grand jury subpoenas requiring foreign financial
institutions to produce account records despite the prohibition of such production under
the financial institutions' local secrecy laws.2 7 Failure to comply with such court order
places the institution in contempt of court, while compliance invokes its liability under
local laws.
The extraterritoriality of the criminal law of money laundering in terms of its appli-
cation with respect to foreign predicate offences also creates its problems for financial
institutions. The banks are expected to know their customers regardless of where they
come from. If the customer is a foreign official the bank is expected to discover this
fact as part of its 'know your customer' obligation. It is also expected to be able to
establish whether the official's deposits are commensurate with his/her income. A United
202. Id. at 303 (arguing that the best way for a small Caribbean country to protect its banks against
devastating U.S. prosecution is by implementing a vigorous compliance program within the
financial institutions that would convince the United States that the bank concerned is a "a
good corporate citizen").
203. Id. at 300.
204. Id. at 299.
205. Id. at 300.
206. FATF Forty Recommendations, supra note 111, Recommendation 22.
207. Morgan, supra note 183, at 43.
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Kingdom non-governmental Working Group2 °s tackling the problem proposed that every
bank should keep an internal register of customers who are Public Sector Officials, mem-
bers of their families, or individuals/entities acting on their behalf."° It also proposed
that financial institutions must investigate and verify the Public Sector Official's stated
sources of funds."' To facilitate this task the group proposed that all countries should
implement a constitutional provision requiring senior public officials to disclose to the
state their full assets."' This information must be incorporated in a certificate indicating
the net worth of the person. The certificate must then be circulated by the state to the
financial institutions worldwide to allow them to compare the official's deposits with its
declared assets as means to establishing the propriety of the source.212
Conscious of the difficulty inherent in the implementation of such a disclosure pro-
cedure, the Group suggested an alternative mechanism that it labelled an "internationally
recognized warranty certificate."213 According to this procedure, any bank transferring
funds that belong to a Public Sector Official must certify "they have known the client
for n years [and] that there have been no suspicious transaction reports or enquiries by
regulatory/judicial authorities in respect of the account/individual during those years "214
In the view of this author both proposals ignore the fact that in grand corruption
either certificate shall be produced by, or under the influence of, the corrupt officials
themselves. Both solutions actually give corrupt officials the chance to circumvent the
suspicious reporting requirement as well as giving the banks a leeway by legitimising their
dealings with the corrupt officials through reliance on the proposed certificates. A better
solution would have been to rely on the generally available information on the economic
performance of the country and what might accordingly seem to be a legitimate income
for an official of a certain rank. Information on the salaries of public servants in different
countries may be compiled by a non-governmental organisation such as 'Transparency
International'2 " to assist the banks in carrying out their obligations.
V. Conclusion
Growing global interdependence has resulted in the transnationalisation of
corruption. Multinational corporations seeking to acquire a share in foreign markets
often resort to the bribery of foreign public officials. The latter in their turn, hoping
to keep their loot beyond the reach of their people, expatriate their corrupt gains and
208. The Anti-Corruption Working Group is an expert working group that was established in July
1997 by the Executive Committee of The Society of Advanced Legal Studies to look into the
issues that arise when financial intermediaries handle the proceeds of corrupt acts overseas.
The Society is a company limited by guarantee that was incorporated in February 1997 with
the object of promoting advanced legal research.






215. Transparency International is a civil society organisation dedicated to the curbing of both
international and national corruption. See http://www.transparency.de.
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deposit them or invest them in foreign countries. These considerations have resulted
in transforming corruption-control into an international policy matter of concern to a
variety of international organisations.
The international community has adopted various tools in its fight against
corruption, all of which aim at tightening the control of corruption by involving the
largest number of its members in the effort to curb the problem. Money laundering
control can serve as a very potent tool in reaching into the territories of countries that
are unwilling to carry out their responsibilities in fighting corruption. By extending the
predicate offence of money laundering to include corruption wherever it is committed,
the international community will be in a better position to prevent the misappropriation
of national wealth by dictators who are beyond democratic accountability.
The role of financial institutions in controlling corruption is crucial. After all, it is
through such institutions that public officials have been able to transfer their corrupt
gains out of the reach of their victims. Money laundering control, through its extensive
financial regulatory mechanism is a very effective tool in securing the co-operation of the
financial institutions. The problems that this poses for the financial sector are significant.
Much effort must be exerted in order to secure the right balance between the need to
prevent corrupt officials from using the financial system to evade accountability, and the
need to maintain its functionality and efficiency.

